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Abstract 
The relationship between oil wealth and the probability of democratization has been widely 
investigated through the last decades. The negative effect that oil seems to have on the 
probability of democratization is named the oil curse. Even though the subject has been 
investigated by many researchers for several years, the effect of oil on the probability of 
democratization in different authoritarian regime types has not yet been studied statistically. 
This thesis investigates how oil rents affect the probability of democratization in three 
different authoritarian regime types: limited multiparty regimes, military regimes and one-
party regimes. I use a cross-sectional time-series dataset covering observations between 1960 
and 2010, investigating if the oil curse is valid for all three regime types and if there are 
differences in the effect of oil between the regime types. The results of the analysis find 
support for the oil curse being present in limited multiparty regimes and one-party regimes. In 
military regimes, oil rents do not seem to have any negative effect on the probability of 
democratization.      
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
The third wave of democratization, starting in the 1970’s, has led to an increasing number of 
scientists investigating the causes of democratic transition. The reasons why some countries 
democratize and some do not are many, and thus, it is a complex field of investigation. One 
factor that has been negatively linked to democratization the last 15 years is natural resource 
wealth. The relationship between natural resource wealth and democratization has been 
established as negative, even though economic growth and wealth in general is associated 
with democratic governance.   
The relationship between natural resource wealth and democracy has been thoroughly 
investigated by political scientists through the last decades. Most studies (see Ross 2013) find 
a negative relationship between natural resource wealth, especially oil wealth, and democracy 
(both democratic development in general and the probability of democratization in 
authoritarian regimes).    
This negative relationship is named “the oil curse” by one of the pioneers on this field of 
investigation, Michael Ross. The oil curse is based on the same theoretical arguments as what 
is known as the resource curse, but oil is seen as the most significant natural resource in terms 
of political effects. This is mainly because oil is the most extracted natural resource (Ross 
2012, Dunning 2008) and hence the resource which generates most wealth. Even if there are 
some contradictory findings (see Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010) and Herb (2005)), most 
studies find support for the oil curse.   
Natural resource wealth has been linked to authoritarian government through two main 
mechanisms: first, resource wealth seems to stabilize authoritarian regimes and decrease the 
probability of democratic transition, second, resource wealth seems to be negatively 
correlated with democracy score in low income countries (Ross 2013: 8).  
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In more detail, the oil curse seems to work through three causal mechanisms, on which I base 
the theoretical framework in chapter three. The three causal mechanisms are: the rentier 
effect, the repression effect and the modernization effect (Ross 2001).  
When investigating democratic transition, the type of authoritarian regime is of importance. 
One variable may promote democratic transition in one authoritarian regime type, without 
having the same effect in another regime type. Different authoritarian regime types can be as 
different by design as democracies and autocracies, and they tend to break down and 
democratize in systematically different ways (Geddes 1999, Hadenius and Teorell 2007). The 
aim of this thesis is to investigate if the oil curse is valid for three different authoritarian 
regime types; military regimes, one-party regimes and limited multiparty regimes, and if the 
effect of oil is stronger in any of the regime types than in one of the others.   
In the next section I introduce the contemporary relevance of my investigation; the puzzle. 
Then I explain this thesis’ contribution to the field of investigation, before I present the 
research question. In the last part of the chapter I introduce some of the essential concepts of 
the thesis.   
 
1.1 The puzzle      
The puzzle starts with the general assumption that natural resources lead to economic 
development which in turn is thought to be positive for the probability of democratization. 
The relationship between economic development and democracy is still complex and to some 
extent uncertain. Even thou many scholars have argued that economic development promotes 
democratization (Lipset 1959, Huntington 2012, Przeworski et al. 2000), the causal 
relationship could as well be reverse. The positive effect economic development seems to 
have on democratization, is somehow negative when this development comes from natural 
resources (Ross 2001: 1). The causality in this case cannot be reverse (McFaul and Stoner-
Weiss 2008); the democratic situation cannot affect the occurrence or prices on natural 
resources. Hence, there has to be some mechanisms which make authoritarian regimes 
stabilize because of natural resource revenues. In order to get more knowledge about the 
social economic consequences of natural resource wealth in authoritarian regimes and about 
democratization processes in general, research on these fields is important.  
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Russia after 2000 serves as an example of how oil revenues can stabilize regimes and allow 
increased authoritarianism according to several researchers (see McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 
2008 and Gustafson 2012). Increasing oil prices after 2000 led to large revenues Putin could 
use to crack down on co-opt independent sources of political power and by off or repress 
opposition forces (McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008: 81). Cracking down on co-opt 
independent sources of political power and buying off opposition is part of what Ross (2001) 
calls the rentier effect, which means that oil money is used to reduce taxes, spend on 
patronage and prevent group formation all in order to relieve social pressure that can lead to 
demands for greater accountability. As Gustafson (2012) points out that: “The spectacular 
growth of state income generated by oil has helped keep Putin in power, enabling him to 
secure the support of key interest groups and maintain, at least until recently, a high level of 
popularity” (Gustafson 2012: 84).   
According to McFaul and Stoner-Weiss: “The data does not support the popular notion that 
by erecting autocracy Putin has built an orderly and highly capable state that is addressing and 
overcoming Russia’s rather formidable development problems” (McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 
2008: 77). First, the security situation has worsened under Putin. Second, public health has 
not improved during the last eight years, despite all the states revenues, health spending has 
gone down as percentage of GDP since the 1990’s. No communicable diseases have become 
the leading cause of death and alcoholism account for 18 percent of deaths for men between 
25 and 54. Third, Russia’s international ranking for economic competitiveness, business 
friendliness and corruption have fallen, and property rights have been undermined (McFaul 
and Stoner-Weiss 2008), all during years of ever higher oil income. This is what Ross (2001) 
calls the modernization effect. The argument of the modernization effect is that revenues from 
natural resources are not causing the social and cultural changes that usually connect 
economic development and democracy.  
Large income from oil and high oil prices have made it possible for Putin to stay in position 
and gain popularity. The effects of an oil based economy is especially evident in Russia and 
several other limited multiparty regimes where the leader have to balance between repression 
and staying popular among a relatively large share of the population.  
The example of Russia illustrates how oil revenues can stabilize a limited multiparty regime 
(Mc Faul and Stoner-Weis 2008), and that oil money in some cases can be more important for 
regime survival and popularity than most other factors. I consider todays Russia as a prime 
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example of the oil curse in the light of Mc Faul and Stoner-Weis’ arguments. This thesis 
investigates if the oil curse is present also in limited multiparty regimes in general, and in 
one-party regimes and military regimes. In chapter three I will discuss the theoretical 
frameworks of oil and democratization in the three regime types in detail.   
 
1.2 My contribution  
The aim of this thesis is to investigate if the oil curse is present in the three authoritarian 
regime types: limited multiparty regimes, military regimes and one-party regimes. The point 
of departure is the preconception that oil rents are negative for the probability of democratic 
transition in authoritarian states. The relationship between oil wealth and democratic 
transition has been investigated by several scholars; see (Ross 2001, Ross 2012, Herb 2005, 
Tsui 2010, Aslaksen 2010 and Smith 2004), and most studies find support for the so called oil 
curse, meaning that oil wealth is impeding democratization.  
Research on the probability for democratization in different authoritarian regime types (oil not 
considered) shows that different regime types tend to democratize in different patterns (See 
Geddes 1999 and Hadenus and Teorell 2007). With that in mind, I argue that the effect of oil 
on the probability of democratization is also likely to be different in different regime types. 
How oil rents affect the probability for democratic transition in different authoritarian regime 
types however, is (to my knowledge) not studied in a large N study. The thesis will 
investigate this relationship between regime type and oil, and how it affects democratization. 
This will add further knowledge to how the mechanisms of the oil curse works, which in turn 
can widen the understanding of regime change in oil exporting authoritarian states.    
 
1.3 Research question 
The thesis is structured by two research questions: 
1. Is the oil curse valid for the three authoritarian regime types: limited multiparty regimes, 
military regimes and one-party regimes? 
2. Are the antidemocratic effects of oil rents stronger in some types of authoritarian regimes 
than others?  
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The first part of the research question treats the conditional effect of oil on the probability of 
democratic transition (dependent variable) in different regime types (independent variable). 
The research is limited to three regime types: one-party regimes, military regimes and limited 
multiparty regimes. The second part of the research question treats the comparative effect of 
oil between the different regime types. In chapter three, the research questions are formed into 
hypotheses based on the theoretical framework.  
 
1.4 Defining concepts    
In the following section I present and define central concepts in the thesis. The concepts are: 
authoritarian regime type, democratic transition, democracy, oil dependence and rents. 
 
1.4.1 Authoritarian regime types  
“(…) different kinds of authoritarian regimes differ from each other as much as they differ 
from democracy” (Geddes 1999: 121). 
I will distinguish between three different authoritarian regime types, found in Hadenius and 
Teorell’s dataset. The three types are military regimes, one-party regimes and limited 
multiparty regimes.   
In military regimes, military officers are major or predominant political actors by actual or 
threatened use of force. A military regime may exercise political power either directly or 
indirectly by controlling civilian leaders. Regimes where persons of military background are 
chosen in open elections are not classified as military, if the election is not controlled by the 
military
1
. Examples of military regimes are Argentina in the late 1970’s and Greece before 
1973. 
Electoral regimes are regimes which hold popular elections for parliament or executive office. 
Both one-party regimes and limited multiparty regimes can be electoral regimes. Elections are 
held in one-party regimes, but all political parties but one are banned, formally or de facto. 
                                                 
1
 Rebel regimes form a special subcategory of military regimes. They include cases where a rebel movement (not 
formed out of the regular armed forces) has taken power by military force and the regime has not yet been 
transformed (Hadenius and Teorell 2007: 146). Rebel regimes and other forms of military regimes will not be 
distinguished in the analysis.         
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Such elections can hold elements of competition, but only among individual candidates 
(Hadenius and Teorell 2007: 147).    
In one party regimes, all political parties are forbidden (formally or de facto) from taking part 
in elections except one. A small number of non-party candidates may be allowed. 
Competition among candidates from the same ruling party may also occur. For a regime to be 
classified as a one-party state, elections must be held. It is not enough for a regime to call 
itself a one-party state like Cuba did before 1976, before a constitution required one-party 
elections to be held. Cuba therefore qualified as a rebel regime until from 1959 to 1976 
(Hadenius and Teorell 2007: 147).        
Limited multiparty regimes hold elections where at least some independent or opposition 
candidates can participate. This classification also holds when a candidate voluntarily refrains 
from participating in elections as a form of protest against prevailing conditions. The point is 
that there is a competition between candidates, but this competition is not free and fair 
(Hadenius and Teorell 2007: 147). Examples of limited multiparty regimes are Russia in the 
2000’s and Mexico before 2000.  
 
1.4.2 Democratic transition 
The dependent variable of this thesis, is democratic transition. Linz and Stephan defines 
democratic transition as follows: “A democratic transition is complete when sufficient 
agreements has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, 
when a government goes to power that is a direct result of a free and popular vote, when this 
government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, 
legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power 
with other bodies de jure” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 3). Throughout the thesis I use the concepts 
democratic transition and democratization alternating. I refer to it as the same thing, even 
though it can be argued that democratization in fact is the process of democratic transition.    
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1.4.3 Democracy 
According to Robert Dahl’s much used definition, “(…) democracy requires not only free, 
fair and competitive elections, but also the freedoms that make them truly meaningful (such 
as freedom of organization and freedom of expression), alternative sources of information, 
and institutions to ensure that government policies depend on the votes and preferences of 
citizens” (Schmitter and Karl 1991 in Diamond 2002: 21). 
This thesis however uses a minimalist definition of democracy, which Joseph Schumpeter 
defines as: “political systems in which the principal positions of power are filled through a 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1947 in Diamond 2002).  
 
1.4.4 Oil dependence 
Not all resource abundant countries can be defined as recourse dependent. Abundance refers 
to the stock of natural resources. Dependence refers to the flow of resources as captured by 
for instance export. Thus, a country can be resource abundant whiteout being resource 
dependent (Oscarsson and Ottosen 2010: 1069). Oil dependence can be defined as oil 
revenues to GDP ratio, which is how much of a states’ GDP is revenues from oil (Dunning 
2008: 19). The authoritarian effects of oil are stronger by resource dependence than by 
resource wealth per se. The intuition behind this argument is that when the whole economy is 
dependent on resources, conflict over distribution of rents is more important, relative to 
redistributive conflict over non-resource wealth or income (Dunning 2008: 62).   
 
1.4.5 Rents 
Natural recourse dependence and rentierism is not the same thing, even thou they are closely 
related. Rentierism is measured as the percentage of rents in government revenues. Oil rents 
are hence the oil to total revenue ratio. A much used definition of rents is that rents come 
from abroad and accrue to the government directly, and “only a few are engaged in the 
generation of this rent (wealth), the majority being only involved in the distribution or 
utilisation of it.” (Beblawi 1990, in Herb 2005). It can be useful adding to the third point that 
not only do few people produce the wealth, but the wealth is a result of a coincidence that is 
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independent of any efforts made by the citizens (Herb 2005: 298). A slightly different 
definition is that rents is a super-normal level of profit; the economic return to natural 
recourse extraction that exceeds labour and other production costs (Dunning 2008: 39). The 
important aspects of rents are hence that the revenues from rents are independent of the states’ 
citizens and come from exportation. The characteristics of natural resource rents exceed the 
definitions above. First, recourse rents tend to be relatively easy taxable. The large costs 
involved in the extraction of much natural recourse create a stabile revenue base that provides 
the state with multiple opportunities for claiming future rents (Monaldi 2002 in Dunning 
2008). Second, because extraction of natural resources are capital-intensive, geographically 
concentrated, and export-oriented industry without widespread linkage to other production 
fields, the natural resource sector seems to be some sort of “enclave”, divorced from the rest 
of the domestic economy (Hirschman 1977 in Dunning 2008). Third, there is often a 
separation between the landlord (the state which collects rents) and a private producer 
(Mommer 2002 in Dunning 2008).      
The main determent whether a recourse abundant state is a rentier state or not (which leads to 
a high recourse to revenue ratio) is the type of natural recourses. Not all types of recourses 
produce rents for the public coffers. Natural recourses that are geographically concentrated, 
generally capital intensive in production and pose high barriers to entry for many private 
actors; are in turn relatively easy for the state to tax, taxing these sectors generally does not 
involve separating citizens from their private income. These are the kinds of natural recourses 
that produce rents. (Dunning 2008: 18). Crude oil is one of them. I will return to the 
mechanisms of rents in chapter three.   
Other types of natural recourses are taxed more or less like taxing other kind of products 
produced by citizens. Certain minerals that are geographically diffuse and demand little in 
start-up costs and can be relatively easy harvested by private actors fall into this category 
(Dunning 2008: 18).    
  
1.4.6 Summary 
In this chapter I have presented the aim of the thesis, the thesis’ research question and some 
central concepts. In the next chapter I will present the background for the oil curse in the 
literature review.    
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Chapter 2 
Literature review  
 
Natural recourses in general and oil in particular have been linked to authoritarianism in a 
large number of empirical studies. The apparent symptoms of too much resource wealth are 
reduction in democratic accountability, bureaucratic effectiveness, female labour force 
participation and rise in economic volatility, corruption and the likelihood of civil war (Ross 
2013: 1). This negative effect of natural resource wealth on democracy is often referred to as 
the resource curse. The literature on the resource curse includes a significant amount of 
studies supporting this negative relationship. Some studies suggest what mechanisms are 
behind the resource curse and a few claim the curse to be false. This chapter begins with a 
review of the literature on the resource curse, with special emphasis on oil. Then I will briefly 
discuss the literature on democratization, before discussing the main literature on regime 
typology. At the end of the chapter I present Ross’ suggested causal mechanisms behind the 
resource curse, before a discussion on oil rents different effects in democracies and 
autocracies. There is robust evidence that one type of mineral wealth, oil, is harmful to 
democratization (Ross 2013). The theoretical framework and the later analysis will therefore 
focus on oil. This literature review covers the general findings in the literature concerning the 
resource curse, democratization and regime typology. In chapter three, I construct a theory 
based on this literature and derive hypothesis for empirical testing.   
 
2.1 The recourse curse 
The resource curse suggests in short that wealth from natural resources is bad for democracy. 
A large number of books and articles analysing the effect of resource wealth are broadly 
consistent with the claim that oil wealth makes authoritarian governments more stable, and 
less likely to democratize (Ross 2013). The resource curse can be defined as “the perverse 
effects of a country’s natural resource wealth on its economic, social, or political well-being” 
(Ross 2013:1). Michael Ross is the first to test this hypothesis in a large-N study. He finds 
support for the hypothesis, and he also finds that natural resources (both oil and minerals) do 
11 
 
greater harm on democracy in poor countries then in rich. He also finds that the effect is not 
limited to the Middle East and finds support for the causal mechanisms that links natural 
resources and authoritarian regimes (Ross 2001). Ross’ findings are supported by several 
other studies (Tsui 2010, Aslaksen 2010 and Smith 2004). Other studies like: Oskarsson and 
Ottosen (2010), and Herb (2005) do not find support for the resource curse. A statistical meta-
analysis of the oil-democracy hypothesis, which integrated the results of 29 studies and 246 
empirical estimates, concluded that oil had a robust negative effect on democracy (Ross 
2013). The findings produce two broad possibilities: oil could strengthen authoritarian 
regimes and prevent them from democratization, and it could weaken democracies and push 
them towards authoritarianism (Ross 2013: 8). This thesis investigates how oil rents affect the 
probability of democratization in different authoritarian regime types, hence I emphasize the 
first possibility; how oil could strengthen authoritarian regimes and prevent democratization.  
In his book “The oil curse” from 2012, Ross finds that in authoritarian states, greater oil 
income lower the chance of democratic transition when using a logit-model with a 
dichotomous dependent variable for democracy. He also finds that higher oil income is 
correlated with lower democracy score on the polity dataset, using an ordinary least square 
(OLS) model (Ross 2012: 108).  
Dunning (2008) tests the resource curse statistically with economic inequality as a conditional 
effect. He finds support for the hypothesis that oil rents can have a positive conditional effect 
on the probability of democratic transition (Dunning 2008), in other words that oil rents can 
have a positive democratic effect on countries with high economic inequality, and a negative 
democratic effect on more equal countries. I will return to this argument in chapter 3. 
There are two types of challenges to the claim that oil stabilizes authoritarian regimes (Ross 
2013). The first is that even if oil has a direct negative effect on democratic transitions, this 
might be counterbalanced by a positive indirect effect; the higher incomes that oil wealth 
tends to bring. Research on this challenge has concluded that oil’s harmful direct effect on 
accountability is greater than its beneficial, indirect effect (Herb 2005, Alexeev and Conrad 
2009, 2011; in Ross 2013). The second challenge to the claim is causal identification, 
meaning that the correlation between oil and authoritarian regime is endogenous or driven by 
omitted variables. Several studies have developed models using historical data and country 
and year fixed effects, but the results are ambiguous (Ross 2013). 
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2.2 Democratization 
Democratization is a highly complex process (Huntington 2012); hence there are several 
variables that can causally affect democratization. This section emphasizes some of the most 
important variables linked to democratization. 
Lipset found in his seminal studies that variables linked to economic development such as 
industrialization, urbanization and level of education is positively correlated with democracy 
(Lipset 1959). Several researchers after Lipset claim that economic development makes 
transition to democracy more likely; see (Huntington 2012). Przeworski et al. (2000), claim 
that economic development is not making democratic transition more likely, but that the 
positive relationship between economic development and democracy is due to wealthy 
countries’ ability to sustain democratic. Even though several researchers find that increased 
wealth tend to make countries more democratic (Ross 2001), this relationship seems to have 
several important conditional effects. As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of these 
conditional effects is oil. The theory of the Dutch disease argues that natural resource wealth 
can even impede countries from experiencing economic development after increased revenues 
from natural resources (Lam and Wantchecon 2002). I return to the Dutch disease in chapter 
three.     
According to Thomas Carothers, the underlying conditions and structures for democratic 
success has become increasingly evident as the third wave of democratization has aged. He 
emphasizes five such factors of particular importance: The level of economic development, 
the concentration of sources of national wealth, identity-based divisions, historical experience 
with political pluralism and neighbouring countries. The factors should not be seen as 
preconditions, but conditions that make democratization harder or easier (Carothers 2007: 
24). Note that these are conditions for democratic success, and not conditions that necessarily 
increase the probability of a democratic transition in an authoritarian state.     
 
2.3 Regime typology 
Since the late 1970’s, the period in political history named the third wave of democratization, 
the number of regimes that are neither clearly democratic nor conventionally authoritarian has 
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grown unprecedented (Diamond 2002). There are a vast number of categories that are used to 
label different regime types. The most frequently used categories are summed up by Larry 
Diamond (2002: 26) and comprise liberal democracy, electoral democracy, ambiguous 
regimes, competitive authoritarian, hegemonic electoral authoritarian and politically closed 
authoritarian. These categories classify regimes after how democratic they are, from closed 
authoritarian to liberal democratic.  
The regime typology in this thesis however is based on institutional characteristics as outlined 
in the previous chapter. The difference between liberal democratic and electoral democratic is 
the same distinction as the difference between a broad and a minimalist definition of 
democracy. (The minimalist definition is used to define democracy in the analysis). Both 
competitive authoritarian and hegemonic electoral authoritarian can be placed in the broader 
category of electoral authoritarian regimes. Competitive authoritarian regimes are defined by 
Levitzky and Way as regimes where “formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the 
principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules 
so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum 
standards for democracy” (Levitzky and Way 2002: 52).  
Research on authoritarian regime types and democratization shows that different regime types 
democratize systematically different. Hadenius and Teorell (2007: 153) discover a certain 
pattern of transitions to democracy in different regime types. One-party regimes and military 
regimes rarely transition directly to democracy. They usually democratize via limited 
multiparty regimes (one-party regimes, however, transition directly to democracy with 21 
percent probability). Pure limited multiparty regimes democratize with a 51 percent 
possibility.  
 
2.4 The causal mechanisms behind the oil curse 
I will now briefly describe the causal mechanisms behind the oil curse, proposed by Ross. I 
will return to these mechanisms in chapter 3, theoretical framework, emphasizing how I 
assume these mechanisms to be present in the different regime types.    
Based on findings in case studies, Ross (2001) implements three causal mechanisms that link 
natural resource dependence to authoritarian rule. The first is the rentier effect which is based 
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on the argument that governments use their oil revenues to relieve social pressures that might 
lead to demands for greater accountability. This can occur in three ways. The first is the 
taxation effect which suggests that oil dependent states tend to tax the population less or not at 
all, and the public in turn will be less likely to demand accountability from their government. 
A second effect is the spending effect. Resource wealth may lead to greater spending on 
patronage, which in turn reduces the latent pressure for democratization. The third component 
can be called a group formation effect. The argument is that if resource revenues provide a 
government with enough money, they will use that money to prevent the formation of social 
groups that are independent from the state and may demand political rights.  
In line with the taxation mechanism, empirical evidence suggests that resource rents tend to 
remove or reduce other forms of revenue, such as income taxation. Resource booms seem to 
alter bureaucratic development substantially with profound implications for democracy with 
decline in domestic taxation in general, and direct taxation in particular as the most important 
changes (Dunning 2008: 46).  
The second causal mechanism is called the repression effect. This effect builds on argument 
that citizens in resource rich countries might want democracy just as much as people 
elsewhere, but resource rich authoritarian states can use more money on internal security and 
repression (Ross 2001).  
The third causal mechanism is derived from modernization theory, which holds that 
democracy is caused by a collection of social and cultural changes. The argument is that 
revenues from natural resources are not causing these social and cultural changes. These 
changes include occupational specialization, urbanization and higher levels of education, that 
in turn are caused by economic development (Ross 2001). I use these three causal 
mechanisms as a point of departure for my theoretical framework in chapter 3. I emphasize to 
what extent these mechanisms can be assumed to be present in military regimes, one-party 
regimes and limited multiparty regimes.    
One interesting exception to the oil cures seems to be the Latin-American oil exporters that 
have transited to democracy during the last decades. In Latin America the effect of oil on 
democratization seems to be opposite from the rest of the world. Among the ten-top oil 
producers that have transited to democracy since 1950, the five countries that made successful 
transits were in Latin America: Venezuela 1958, Bolivia 1982, Argentina 1983, Mexico 2000, 
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and Ecuador 2002. All of Latin Americas oil producers are now democracies. Latin American 
countries with oil were more than twice as likely to democratize, while in the rest of the 
world, countries without oil were more than four times more likely to democratize (Ross 
2012: 85). One reason for this exception seems to be prior experience with democracy (Ross 
2012). Another reason is according to Dunning (2008) economic inequality. I include both 
these mechanisms as control variables in the analysis. Economic inequality is also discussed 
in conjunction with the rentier effect in the theoretical framework.  
 
2.5 Oil rents in democracies and autocracies  
One remaining question is how oil affects democracies and autocracies differently. This thesis 
focus on how oil affects different authoritarian regime types and it seems, based on the 
literature, that oil has a more negative effect on autocracies probability of democratization 
than it has on the democratic development in already democratic states, see (Ross 2012, 2013 
and Dunning 2008). The impact of oil in democracies is more ambiguous, indicating that oil 
might be more regime stabilizing than anti-democratic (Ross 2013: 8). Several researchers 
find that oil has a pro-democratic effect in democracies, either by making the governments 
more stable, or by improving their democracy score (Smith 2004, Morrison 2009, Dunning 
2008, Tsui 2011; in Ross 2013). Other studies find no evidence that oil helps stabilize 
democratic regimes (Caselli and Tesei 2011, Weins, Post and Clark 2011, Al-Ubaydli 2012; 
in Ross 2013). A third group of studies show that even if oil has no aggregate effect on 
democratic stability, it can under certain conditions promote the breakdown of some 
democratic regimes, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, or more generally among low and 
middle-income states (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004, Ross 2012; in Ross 2013). This issue is 
though unsettled because there are few oil-rich democracies (Ross 2013).     
 
2.6 Summary 
In this chapter I have discussed some of the most important findings in the literature regarding 
the oil curse, democratization in general and regime typology. I also presented Ross’ causal 
mechanisms behind the oil curse, later used in the theoretical framework in chapter 3. This 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the different effects of oil rents in autocracies and 
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democracies. It seems that oil is not as harmful to democracies as to the likelihood of 
democratic transition in authoritarian states, and that oil might be more regime stabilizing in 
both authoritarian and democratic states, than anti-democratic. In the following chapter I will 
go deeper into the theory of the resource curse and make hypotheses for the statistical 
analysis. 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical framework  
 
In this chapter I present the theoretical framework for investigating how oil rents affect the 
probability of democratization in military regimes, one party regimes and limited multiparty 
regimes. The theoretical framework is based on the causal mechanisms proposed by Ross’ 
(2001, 2012). The causal mechanisms link oil rents to authoritarianism by three causal effects: 
the rentier effect, the repression effect and the modernization effect. I present the causal 
mechanisms and emphasize to what extent these mechanisms are present in the different 
regime types in order to investigate how oil rents affect the probability of democratization in 
military regimes, one-party regimes and limited multiparty regimes. After presenting the 
causal mechanisms, I discuss the three regime types in order to derive hypothesis about 
whether the oil curse is present in that specific regime type or not. In the end of the chapter, I 
discuss in which of the three regime types I assume the oil curse to be more or less present.         
 
3.1 Basic assumptions  
I will start this chapter with three basic assumptions which I argue are prerequisites for the 
further discussion about democratic transition in rentier states.  
The first assumption is that politics is defined by a conflict between a relatively small group 
of elites and a relatively large group of masses, or citizens (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 
2001a in Dunning 2008: 62). Natural resource booms make holding political power more 
valuable because political power involves control over resource rents. Rents increase elites’ 
incentives to stage a coup against an existing democracy. Under an existing authoritarian 
regime, elites have greater incentives to counter mobilization from below with repression or 
targeted transfers of revenue, rather than democratizing (Dunning 2008: 61). Hence in an 
authoritarian regime with natural resource wealth, the elites have both greater incentives to 
work against democratization and more resources to do so. This leads to the second 
assumption; that incumbents want to stay in power (De Mesquita et. al. 1995). In a 
consolidated democracy, this means that the party in position tries to stay in power by 
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winning the next free and fair election. In an authoritarian state, the power holders must keep 
their positions by repressing or buying of opposition and potential challengers. The third 
assumption is that the relatively large group of masses want democracy (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006:24, 25). If the masses are disaffected with the current situation, the chance of 
revolt should be greater. One can then also assume that it is more likely to sustain an 
authoritarian regime if the masses are satisfied, and that this is easier to achieve with high 
state revenues.       
 
3.2 The causal mechanisms  
My point of departure for the theoretical frameworks is the causal mechanisms behind the 
authoritarian effect of oil rents proposed by Ross (2001, 2012). As pointed out earlier, the 
three causal mechanisms are the rentier effect, the repression effect and the modernization 
effect. I will start by discussing the rentier effect, before I continue with the repression effect 
and the modernization effect.   
 
3.2.1 The mechanisms of rents 
The causal mechanisms behind the argument that resource rents impede democratization are 
of three sorts, concerning state revenues, state expenditures and society. First, (more or less) 
freedom from taxes releases the state from the accountability people would demand under 
collection of income tax. The state may be virtually autonomous from its people, winning 
popularity through distribution rather than through representation and redistribution by taxing. 
Second, rents increase the states ability to buy off opposition. These two mechanisms are 
referred to as social contract in which the state provides goods and services to citizens and 
citizens provides state officials a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making. (Herb 2005: 
298). The third component of the rentier effect is that the power holders can prevent group 
formation. This component implies that governments can use the rent money to prevent the 
formation of social groups that are independent from the state, and may be inclined to demand 
political rights. The state is by doing this blocking a necessary precondition for democracy 
(Ross 2001: 334).    
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The theory developed in Dunning (2008) says that resource rents can both produce a 
democratic effect and an authoritarian effect. Dunning argues that inequality of non-resource 
wealth or income strengthens the democratic effect of resource rents. This is not because 
inequality of private income itself is good for democracy, thus inequality itself is harmful to 
emergence and consolidation of democracy. Inequality can produce greater differences in 
terms of preferences between elites and masses over redistribution. Because poorer citizens’ 
preference of greater redistribution is thought to be more influential in democracies, 
democracy is more costly to elites in unequal societies. Where redistribution is a greater 
concern for elites, the effect of resource rents is that the rents are moderating the redistributive 
conflicts, and this moderating effect is stronger than the authoritarian effects of the same rents 
in unequal societies. So, while inequality itself hurts democracy, resource rents temper the 
negative impact of inequality, ceteris paribus (Dunning 2008: 21, 22).    
As pointed out earlier, there is a negative empirical relationship between resource rents and 
taxation, and lack of taxation is known to have a negative impact on the chances of 
democratization. There are several explanations behind the relationship between rents and 
taxes. One explanation is that a resource boom may affect the marginal benefit of public 
spending without affecting the marginal cost of taxation of private income. The resource 
boom gives rise to a negative relationship between rents and preferred tax rates. Another 
reason is that taxing is more costly for the state (by encouraging production to non-taxable 
activity or by promoting capital flight) than distribution of resource rents. In the absence of 
resource rents, states may be more willing to pay the aggregate costs of taxing their citizens, 
and people may be more willing to pay tax (Dunning 2008: 51). 
Dunning’s theory distinguishes between what he calls the direct authoritarian effect of 
resource rents and the indirect democratic effect of rents. Resource booms may increase the 
incentives to control the distribution of resource rents and decrease the attractiveness of 
democracy to elites. A resource boom may also reduce the redistribution of private income 
through taxation and thereby increase the attractiveness of democracy. The latter is the 
indirect democratic effect of rents. It is indirect because it works through the effect of 
resource rents on the redistribution of private income under democracy (Dunning 2008).  
The conceptual distinction between distribution of resource rents and redistribution of private 
income is important to Dunning’s theory of natural recourses’ political effects. Recourse rents 
comes in to a states exchequer almost as “manna from heaven” in contrast to taxation which is 
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more costly and involve redistribution of income from one set of citizens to others, or from 
one purpose to another. Unlike the distribution of resource wealth, redistribution through 
taxation involves taking from someone to give to others, or give back to them in some other 
form (Dunning 2008: 11).       
To sum up, the rentier effect in already authoritarian states can on one hand make autocrats 
use distribution of rents to relieve pressure from the masses, and prevent opposition and social 
grouping. On the other hand, resource rents can make democracy less threatening to elites 
because distribution of rents can make the relative poor majority wanting to tax the rich elites’ 
non resource income and wealth less than without the rents. The latter seems to be the case 
especially in economically unequal societies; because the rents seem to temper the negative 
impact inequality has on democratization.     
As a conclusion regarding the rentier effect, I assume that oil rents make democratization less 
likely in relatively economically equal societies, contrary to unequal societies. The Gini index 
measures economic inequality among citizens, where high values indicate high levels of 
inequality. The index runs from a minimum of 20 to a maximum of 74. Limited multiparty 
regimes are most economic unequal with a mean score of 41.9, while one-party regimes are 
most economic equal with a mean score of 34.8. Hence, I assume that the antidemocratic 
mechanisms of oil rents are more significant in one-party regimes than in the other regime 
types. The overall mean, however, are 42.6. This indicates that limited multiparty regimes and 
military regimes are close to the overall mean level of inequality.  
Table 3.1. Mean score on the Gini index.  
Authoritarian regime type Mean score on Gini index 
Limited multiparty regime 41.931 
Military regime 40.776 
One-Party regime 34.806 
Others 41.859 
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3.2.2 The repression effect 
Case studies from the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia suggest that oil wealth and 
authoritarianism can be linked by repression (Ross 2001). It is a reasonable assumption that 
the citizens in authoritarian oil states want democracy just as much as citizens in other states, 
but the oil wealth allow their government to spend more on internal security, and hence 
repress popular challengers. Ross points out two reasons why resource wealth may lead to 
larger military forces. One is of pure self-interest: an authoritarian government is ready to arm 
itself against popular pressure, given the opportunity. A second reason might be that a larger 
military reflects the government’s response to ethnic or regional conflict caused by resource 
wealth (Ross 2001: 335).    
 
3.2.3 The modernization effect 
The modernization effect of natural resource wealth holds that wealth from natural resources 
does not entail the social changes that normally follows with economic development, and has 
an impact on the likelihood of democratic transition. Ingelhart (in Ross 2001: 336) argues that 
two types of social change have a direct effect on the likelihood of democratization: “1. 
Rising education levels, which produce a more articulate public that is better equipped to 
organize and communicate, and 2. Rising occupational specialization, which first shifts the 
workforce into the secondary sector and then into the tertiary sector. These changes produce a 
more autonomous workforce, accustomed to thinking for themselves on the job and having 
specialized skills that enhance their bargaining power against elites”.  
The theory claiming that development leads to democratization developed by Lipset (1959 
and 1981), Coleman (1963), Rustow (1970) and Huntington (1984) (in Pourgerami 1988) 
argues that there is a positive connection between economic development and political 
contestation. A developed country is more likely to democratize and stay democratic. The 
theory has been challenged by several scholars arguing that economic development can foster 
new authoritarian regimes that are stronger and long lasting (Pourgerami 1988). Lipset, 
Rustow and Huntington specify five conditions which have to follow economic development 
to generate democratization: 1. Market economy. 2. Increased living standards. 3. Increased 
levels of education. 4. Increased social diversity. 5. Tolerance in society of diversity and 
compromise (Pourgerami 1988).   
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Przeworski et al. (2000: 137) find that the relationship between development and democracy 
is not a consequence of economic development under dictatorships in the way that they 
democratize, but that democracies are much more likely to survive in wealthy societies. They 
also claim that modernization theory has little or no explanatory power regarding 
democratization.  
Hence, it might be other aspects which are more important for democratic transition than 
development itself. Samuel Huntington (Huntington 1991: 13) emphasizes five major factors 
contributing to the occurrence and timing of the so called third-wave transitions to democracy 
in the 1970’s and 1980’s. First of these factors are the deepening legitimate problems of 
authoritarian regimes in a world where democratic values were widely accepted, these 
regimes dependence’ on successful performance and their inability of maintaining 
“performance legitimacy” due to economical and sometimes military failure. Second is the 
global growth of the 1960’s which raised living standards, increased education and expanded 
the urban middle class in many countries. Third there was a transformation of national 
catholic churches from defenders of existing regimes to opponents of authoritarianism. 
Fourth, there was changes in the politics of external actors, especially the European 
community, the United States and the Soviet Union, and fifth the “snowball effect” from early 
examples of third wave democratization which stimulated efforts at democratization in other 
countries (Huntington 1991: 13). The third wave of democratization however was based on 
five assumptions about democratization, which now seem to be wrong. The first assumption 
was that any country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered as moving towards 
democracy. The second assumption is that democratization occurs in stages: the opening, the 
breakthrough and finally the consolidation. Third is the belief in the determinative importance 
of elections. Fourth is that underlying conditions like political history, institutional legacies, 
economic level is not going to be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the 
transition process. Fifth is the assumption that transitions making up the third wave was being 
built on coherent functional states. As the third wave of democratization now according to 
several scholars has come to an end, none of these assumptions are no longer appropriate 
(Carothers 2002). The first two of these assumptions are evidently not appropriate looking at 
the world today. The most common type of authoritarian regime today is some form of 
electoral authoritarian regime (Schedler 2010: 69). Second, elections have, in many cases, the 
function of legitimizing the existing regime more than movement in a democratic direction 
(Brownlee 2007).           
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Regarding the modernization effect of oil wealth, one legitimate question is if natural resource 
booms create economic growth or not. According to the well-known theory called the Dutch 
disease, the latter could often be the case. The Dutch disease claims that some countries 
experience negative economic development from natural resource occurrence (Lam and 
Wantchekon 2002). One mechanism behind “Dutch disease” is that great natural resource 
occurrence and revenues lead to a decrease in other sectors. Continued “Dutch disease” 
creates a massive growth in services, transport and other none tradables which affects 
agriculture and industry negatively. This dynamic seems to be hard to turn and a bad spiral 
can occur which makes a country even more dependent on natural resources (Karl 1997).  
The Dutch disease helps explain why oil wealth does surprisingly little to aid other parts of 
the economy, and there are several empirical examples that the Dutch disease is real. After the 
oil booms of the 1970s, the Dutch disease hurt the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of 
oil exporting countries, including Algeria, Colombia, Ecuador, Nigeria, Trinidad, and 
Venezuela. In Nigeria, the Dutch disease devastated industries built on the export of cocoa, 
palm oil, and rubber from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. Booming oil exports also led to a 
drop in manufactured exports in Algeria in the late 1970s, and again in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s (Ross 2012: 48). Although, if the income generated from oil exports is greater 
than the income lost in manufacturing and agriculture, the country should still be better off 
(Matsen and Torvik 2005).  
The Dutch disease can still be harmful, regardless of the total income, if oil production has 
side effects that might not show up in a simple economic analysis, as for example shift of a 
country’s economic activities from the private sector to the government. Since oil sectors are 
generally owned by governments, while manufacturing and agricultural sectors are typically 
in private hands, governments will expand and other (private) sectors will experience 
declining profitability and be reduced (Ross 2012: 49).  For example, natural resource wealth 
can lead to natural resource dependence, increasing the authoritarian effect of rents (Dunning 
2008: 105). The political effects of the Dutch disease will depend on the sectoral composition 
of the economy and the economic basis of elites (Dunning 2008: 273). The effects of the 
Dutch disease on democratization in different regime types are considered in my model 
through the variable oil rents, which is measured by the oil export to total export ratio. The 
size of the non-resource sectors will then indirectly be part of the analysis.   
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To summarize the two theories discussed above, the modernization effect and the Dutch 
disease; the modernization effect of oil described by Ross hinders the positive effects of 
economic development normally associated with democracy (even though modernization 
theory is controversial, as discussed). The Dutch disease means that other industrial sectors 
can be decreased in favour of natural resources; though most countries are likely to be better 
off in terms of economic development if the natural resource sector compensates for the 
decrease. 
 
3.3 Authoritarian regime types and democratization  
The differences between authoritarian regime types cause them to break down in 
systematically different ways, and this affects transition outcomes (Geddes 1999). As 
mentioned earlier, limited multiparty regimes most often transition to democracy, military 
regimes have the shortest lifespan and tend to transition to limited multiparty regimes, while 
one-party regimes tend to transition both to military regimes, limited multiparty regimes and 
democracy with approximately the same frequency. Politics in authoritarian governments 
involves factionalism, competition and struggle, as in all other regimes, and this competition 
takes different forms in different authoritarian regimes and has different consequences 
(Geddes 1999: 121). Different types of authoritarianism also have different prospects for 
survival and for democratic transition. But the breakdown of an authoritarian regime does not 
necessarily mean an onset of a democratic transition. (Hadenius and Teorell 2007:  
 
Table 3.2. Democratic transitions from limited multiparty, one-party and military regimes 
between 1960 and 2010.   
Regime type: Observations Democratic transitions 
Limited multiparty 1454 22 
One-part 810 11 
Military 424 23 
Other 
Total 
3956 
6644 
23 
79 
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3.4 Military regimes 
Military regimes transition most frequently to limited multi- party systems. Nevertheless, 
Military/one-party regimes most commonly transition into pure military regimes, indicating 
that the military element often is the most influential. Military/multiparty regimes, on the 
other hand, most frequently transition to democracy, suggesting that the plural element of 
these regimes tends to be the strongest
2
. (Hadenius and Teorell 2007: 152).  
 
Table 3.3. Democratizations from military regimes 1960-2010: 
Country Year 
Argentina 1972, 1982 
Bangladesh  1985 
Burundi 1992 
Chile 1989 
Ecuador  1978 
Fiji 1991 
Ghana  1978 
Greece  1973 
Mauritania 2006 
Nigeria 1978, 1998 
Peru 1978 
Guinea-Bissau 2003 
Sierra Leone 1995 
Sudan 1985 
Suriname  1987, 1990 
Thailand 1978, 1991, 2007 
Turkey 1982 
Uganda 1979 
 
Geddes (1999) offers an explanation of why military regimes seem to be the most fragile and 
have the shortest life expectancy. It starts with two simplifying assumptions of politics in 
                                                 
2
 Only pure military regimes are part of the analysis. 
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democratic regimes: a) politicians want to get into office and remain there; b) the best strategy 
for doing so is to give constituents what they want. Even if these assumptions need 
modification in the context of authoritarian regimes, even very repressive regimes need some 
support. But one can ask if potential authoritarian leaders always want to achieve office and 
try to hold on to power (Geddes 1999: 125). Geddes argues that this is not always true for 
military officers.  
Research shows that officers in different countries have different ideologies and sympathize 
towards different societal interests, so there cannot be made any generalizations about the 
interests or policies that officers are likely to support (Geddes 1999). It is however apparent in 
the literature that soldiers place a higher value on the survival and efficacy of the military 
itself than on anything else (Janowitz 1960, 1977; Finner 1975, Bienen 1978-, DeCalo1976; 
Kennedy 1976, Van Doom 1968, 1969 in Geddes 1999: 126). Because of this, military 
officers will only join coup conspiracies if they believe that the civilian government prevents 
the achievement of their own goals, in other words only if they believe that the military 
institution itself is threatened. The worst possible outcome for the military as an institution is 
civil war where one part of the military is fighting the other. The most important concern for 
an officer deciding whether to join a coup conspiracy or not is then their estimation of how 
many others who will join (Geddes 1999: 126). It is then reasonable to assume that military 
officers not always want to get into office and stay there, and that this can be an explanation 
for why military regimes are the most fragile. The second basic assumption must then be 
reconsidered regarding military regimes.   
Several researchers have found a negative relationship between military expenditures and 
democracy; see (Ross 2001, Kimenyi and Mbaku 1994 and Mbaku 1990). According to 
Mbaku violence is an important rent-seeking behaviour in dictatorships. Since the military has 
a comparative advantage in violence, the military has emerged as the dominant rent-seeking 
interest group politically unstable countries. In cases where the military is the dominant group 
and provides the dictator with protection in exchange for rents, the military will work against 
interest groups who can threaten the dictator’s power or the military’s rent stream (Mbaku 
1994). One can assume that the military is the dominant group in military regimes. Given 
Mbaku’s argument one can also assume that the more rents that are available, the stronger is 
this military rent-seeking mechanism. Hence, it is likely that in military regimes with high oil 
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export to total export ratio, Ross’ rentier effect will be stronger then in military regimes with a 
low ratio. 
Davenport (2007) finds that military governments are less repressive than other forms of 
autocracy when it comes to civil liberties restrictions, but they are more repressive than others 
when violent activities such as torture and mass killing are considered. Looney (1990) finds a 
positive relationship between a countries military spending and the degree of internal 
repression, but that military regimes not necessarily spend more on defence than other 
regimes. It seems that there is no certain trend regarding the level of repression compared to 
other regime types, but based on the findings above I assume that the repression effect from 
oil rents is present in military regimes, though not necessarily to a larger extent than in other 
regimes.   
Military regimes have in general higher levels of economic development than the other 
authoritarian regime types (Geddes 1999). If oil rents counts for some of this economic 
development, one can assume that the modernization effect is present. Even though military 
regimes do not necessarily spend more on defence it appears that a set of socioeconomic 
differences exist concerning the impact of military expenditures. It seems that military 
regimes (but not highly militarized countries in general) systematically reduce health and 
education budgets with increased defence burdens. In addition it seems that military regimes, 
in contrast to civilian regimes with little militarisation, is less likely to solve increased 
military expenditures through foreign loans, but through diverting resources to defence from 
low-income groups (Loony 1990: 137). Regarding the modernization effect of oil rents, I 
assume that oil can inhibit military regimes from reducing resources to education and health 
despite increased military expenditures. I must add that the potential modernization effect is a 
highly complex issue, and the literature on military regimes concerning this issue is not 
sufficient to expect the effect to be more or less present.     
As mentioned, military officers are most concerned about the survival and efficacy of the 
military itself, and may not always want to stay in office. It is likely that oil rents make it 
more attractive for officers to stay in power in rentier states than in non-rentier military 
regimes. Regarding economic inequality and the rentier effect, military regimes are not 
statistically far from the overall mean level of inequality. Hence, there is no reason to assume 
that the rentier effect will be either more or less significant for military regimes than other 
regime types.  
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Before deriving the first hypothesis, I will sum up the discussion about the causal mechanisms 
of oil and democratization in military regimes. I assumed above that the rent-seeking 
mechanisms are strong in military regimes; hence Ross’ rentier effect is thought to be present. 
A second assumption was that the repression effect was not in general more significant than 
in other regimes, though military regimes tend to be more repressive regarding torture and 
mass killing. The theory of military regimes and government spending indicates that oil rents 
can make military regimes less obligated to reduce health and education budgets in favour of 
military spending when facing increased military expenditures. With this in mind, I assume 
that the general negative relationship between oil and democratization is valid also for 
military regimes, and derive the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. The oil curse is valid for military regimes. 
 
3.5 One-party regimes 
One-party regimes are classified by Hadenius and Teorell (2007) as regimes where all parties 
but one are forbidden, formally or de facto. Pure one-party states show a complex pattern of 
change. They transition with similar frequency to three other forms of authoritarian rule: 
dominant multiparty systems, non-dominant multiparty systems, or pure military regimes, and 
with some lower frequency directly to democracy (Hadenius and Teorell 2007).   
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Table 3.4. Democratizations from one-party regimes 1960-2010. 
Country Year 
Albania 1990 
Bulgaria 1989 
Cape Verde 1989 
Comoros 1989 
Czechoslovakia  1988 
Hungary  1989 
Malawi 1993 
Mongolia 1989 
Poland 1988 
Romania 1989 
Sao Tome and Principe 1990 
 
 
Scholars have shown that compared to other types of autocracy, one-party regimes last longer 
(Huntington 1968, Geddes 2003, Magaloni 2008 in Magaloni and Kricheli 2010), suffer fewer 
coups (Cox 2008, Geddes 2008, Kricheli 2008 in Magaloni and Kricheli 2010), have better 
counterinsurgency capacity (Keefer 2008 in Magaloni and Kricheli 2010), and enjoy higher 
economic growth (Keefer 2007, Gandhi 2008, Gehlbach and Keefer 2008, Wright 2008c in 
Magaloni and Kricheli 2010: 124).  
Students of one-party regimes view the ruling party as having two functions which count for 
one-party regimes superiority: a bargaining function and a mobilizing function. The 
bargaining function is how dictators use the party to bargain with the elites and minimize 
potential threats to their stability. The mobilizing function is where dictators use the party 
machine to mobilize mass support (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010: 124, 125).  
Scholars have suggested several hypotheses about dictators’ use of pseudodemocratic 
institutions, such as the party, to avoid elite challenge and enhance their lifespan as dictators. 
One hypothesis is that dictators can use institutions like this to distribute economic transfers 
and rents, and by this co-opting potential rivals (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010: 126). This can 
be done by using licenses, offices and access to economic resources in order to invest political 
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players with a stake in the rulers’ survival (Wintrobe 1998, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003 in 
Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). Dictators can use the institutions within the ruling party to 
make power-sharing deals with potential elite opponents. The party controls succession and 
access to power positions, while the dictator can still change policy arbitrarily. Party cadres 
will support the regime only if they can be promoted into rent-paying positions. If they do not 
expect their positions to pay off in such ways, elites will split and the instability is more likely 
(Magaloni and Kricheli 2010: 127). One can say about one-party regimes that when they are 
well institutionalized, the ruling party should be understood as a giant patronage system 
which gives the citizens a personal interest in the stability and durability of the regime 
(Magaloni 2006, Geddes 2006, 2008, Pepinsky 2007 in Magaloni and Kricheli 2010: 128).  
It seems, considering this, that the rentier effects from oil are strong in one-party regimes. 
Both buying off elites and preventing group formation are typical mechanisms in these 
regimes, and some of the explanation why they are the most stable and durable authoritarian 
regime type. These are mechanisms I assume will be stronger the more rents the regime has 
access to, because the patronage behaviour itself is based on distributing rents. In addition, the 
one-party state can retain stable support from the masses if buying off elites (using oil 
revenues) does not affect the distribution to citizens.     
One-party regimes are consistently the least repressive form of autocracy according to 
Davenport (2007: 500). One-party regimes are less likely to restrict civil liberties and violate 
personal integrity. Davenport argues that there is a “tyrannical peace” in that one-party 
governments possess some of the characteristics of democracies that reduce repression. This 
is done by incorporating a greater share of the population in the political process. There is no 
reason to think that one-party regimes with oil rents are considerably more repressive than 
non-rentier one-party regimes, given the “tyrannical peace”. I assume that already repressive 
regimes are more inclined to increase their repression using resources from oil. One can also 
assume, given one-party regimes’ patronage and ability to build popular support, that 
repression is not necessary to a large extent.  
The rentier effect seems to be strong in one-party regimes. The repression effect does not 
seem to be strong, but this is most likely because these regimes usually do not need to be very 
repressive. Based on the discussion above, I derive the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. The oil curse is valid for one-party regimes. 
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3.6 Limited multiparty regimes 
Limited multiparty regimes with one dominant party, the most common transition is to a more 
competitive multiparty system, while the majority of transitions from limited multiparty 
regimes with no dominant party result in democracy. The typical stepstone towards 
democracy is thereby an authoritarian multiparty regime without a single dominant party 
(Hadenius and Teorell 2007: 152). Regression analyses also indicate that limited multiparty 
systems are more likely to democratize than other authoritarian regime types, all other 
possible determinants of democratization being equal (Hadenius and Teorell 2007: 154).  
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Table 3.5. Democratizations from limited multiparty regimes between 1960 and 2010. 
Country Year 
Comoros  2003 
Ecuador 2001 
El Salvador 1983 
Georgia 2003 
Ghana  1992 
Guatemala  1985 
Indonesia 1988 
Kenya 1997 
Kyrgyzstan  2004 
Liberia 2005 
Madagascar 1992 
Maldives 2007 
Mexico  1999 
Niger 1992 
Paraguay 1988 
Peru 2000 
Philippines  1985 
Portugal 1975 
Senegal 1999 
Serbia and Montenegro 1999 
Sri Lanka 1988 
Uruguay 1984 
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The basic feature of limited multiparty regimes is that elections take place where there is a 
degree of competition between parties or candidates (who choose to act as individuals), but 
this competition is however not free and fair. Limited multiparty regimes correspond closely 
to Levitsky and Way’s “competitive authoritarianism” and Schedler’s “electoral 
authoritarianism” (Hadenius and Teorell 2007: 147). “In competitive authoritarian regimes, 
formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and 
exercising political authority” (Levitsky and Way 2002: 52). However, incumbents violate the 
rules for gaining political power through these institutions to an extent that they cannot be 
considered democratic (Levitsky and Way 2002: 52).  
Levitsky and Way emphasize four arenas of democratic contestation which are violated (one 
or more) in limited multiparty regimes. The most important arena for this analysis is the 
electoral arena
3
. Although the electoral process in limited multiparty regimes may be 
characterized by abuse of state power and harassment of opposition candidates, elections are 
regularly held free of massive fraud. As a result, these elections may be considerably 
uncertain. Autocratic incumbents must therefore take electoral opponents seriously (Levitsky 
and Way 2002: 55). These incumbents must as a consequence balance between maintain 
popularity in relatively large groups of citizens, and control the opposition to stay in power. 
Both these challenges are easier with rent money, in line with the redistribution by tax vs. 
distribution of rents -discussion above.  Leaders in limited multiparty regimes can hence buy 
themselves popularity through distribution and at the same time gain democratic legitimation 
through the formal institutions. The argument is very similar to that of one-party regimes, and 
I assume the mechanisms regarding the rentier effect in limited multiparty regimes are 
relatively similar. Venezuela under Hugo Chaves and Russia under Putin are examples of 
limited multiparty regimes where an authoritarian leader has made use of oil revenues to 
balance between popularity among citizens and control of the opposition.  
I assume that the repression effect is not as important in limited multiparty regimes as in 
military regimes and one-party regimes. This is because limited multiparty regimes are in 
general more liberal then the two other types; hence repression is not as important as a mean 
for staying in position. I consider limited multiparty regimes to be more liberal, simply 
because they allow a certain degree of group formation and opposition. This does not mean 
                                                 
3
 The dependent variable is measured by a minimalist definition of democracy which defines democracy as a 
regime with real contested elections.  
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that repression does not exist and cannot possibly be increased by oil rents, but I assume that 
the effect is not very strong.   
Hypothesis 3. The oil curse is valid for limited multiparty regimes. 
It seems, based on the discussions about the three authoritarian regime types, that the negative 
effects of oil on the possibility of democratization is stronger in one-party regimes, than in the 
other two regime types. The rentier mechanism seems to be significant in this regime type 
given the “patronage argument” and the “tyrannical peace” theory. In addition, one-party 
regimes are more economically equal than the other regime types which according to 
Dunning’s theory makes oil rents more likely to have an antidemocratic effect. Based on this, 
my last two hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 4. The negative effect of oil on the probability of democratization is stronger in 
one-party regimes than in military regimes and limited multiparty regimes.    
Hypothesis 5. The negative effect of oil on the probability of democratization is stronger in 
limited multiparty regimes than in military regimes.  
 
Two factors that are not included in the analysis are resource ownership and revenue 
volatility. Revenue volatility refers to the cycles of ups and downs in resource prices on the 
international market (Dunning 2008: 269). Resource ownership can be crucial for the political 
effects of rents if the domestic elite own the resource rents and not the state (Dunning: 276: 
276).  I choose not to consider revenue volatility in the analysis because it is not crucial to the 
political effects of oil in different regime types. High resource prices can affect authoritarian 
regimes in the sense that the authoritarian effects of resource revenues can be strengthened 
because the revenues will be higher, but these cycles will be the same for any regime. Oil is 
mostly a state owned resource, so resource ownership is neither included in the analysis.         
 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter I have presented the theoretical framework of the thesis. I started by presenting 
the causal mechanisms of Ross (2001, 2012), suggesting causal links why oil seems to impede 
democratization. These causal mechanisms are the rentier effect, the repression effect and the 
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modernization effect. I have emphasized how these mechanisms are present in the different 
regime types in order to derive hypotheses on how oil affects the probability of 
democratization in military regimes, one-party regimes and limited multiparty regimes. In the 
next chapter I will present the research design and dependent, independent and control 
variables.    
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Chapter 4 
Research design 
 
 
In this chapter I present the research design and the choice of variables. The aim of the thesis 
is to investigate how oil rents affect the probability of democratisation in military regimes, 
one-party regimes and limited multiparty regimes. The analysis investigates if the oil curse is 
valid for all three regime types and if the effect of oil rents is stronger in one regime type than 
in others.   
The chapter begins with a discussion of the choice of a quantitative design, before it continues 
with a presentation of the statistical model. I then briefly discuss the methodological 
challenges of the model, including serial correlation, endoginity, multicoliniarity and missing 
values. In the last part of the chapter I present the independent variable, the dependent 
variable and the interaction variable, before I present a number of control variables.   
 
4.1 Why a quantitative design?  
The goal of all social science is inference on the basis of empirical information about the 
world. All research designs can be divided into four components: research question, theory, 
data and use of the data. The choice of research design should be the best way of answering 
the question of research (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 7-17). Democratization is a 
complex field, and in order to investigate deeply what caused democratic transition in one 
particular country one need to look at that case specifically. But, in order to make general 
inference about how oil rents affects the probability of democratic transition in different 
regime types one have to investigate a large number of units. A quantitative design is the best 
way to make general inference about how oil rents affects the probability of democratization 
in the three regime types under investigation. By looking at the same countries in repeated 
observations of the same variables over time one is able to discover general trends about how 
oil rents affect democratic transition in different regime types.      
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4.2 Time-series cross-section data 
The data used in the analysis is time series-cross section data (TSCS). Such data is a type of 
repeated observations of the same units over time (Beck 2001). The units in this analysis are 
country-years and the time series runs from 1960 to 2010
4
. The data set consists of 169 
countries and more than 7000 observations. The data is based on the Quality of government 
dataset (Teorell et al. 2013).  
 
4.3 Statistical model 
The main concern of the thesis and dependent variable is transition to democracy.  The 
dependent variable is based on a minimalist definition of democracy (discussed in more detail 
below) and takes binary values; 1 – democracy and 0 – dictatorship. The variable is lagged by 
one year in order to investigate democratic transition. I will return to the definition and 
operationalization of democracy under later in the chapter. The analysis will be a probit 
regression, because I do not assume there will be a linear relationship between oil and 
democratic transition in the different regime types. In a probit model one can estimate the 
probability of democratization, dependent on the variables of choice.   
The basic probit model can be written:  Pr. (Y  =1) = ɸ (X · ᵦ)  
Here ɸ is the normal cumulative distribution function, Y is dependent variable, X is 
independent variable and ᵦ is the maximum likelihood estimated parameter. 
The aim of the thesis is to analyse how oil affects democratization in different authoritarian 
regime types; limited multiparty regimes, military regimes and one-party regimes. The 
Independent variable is authoritarian regime type. The interaction variable is oil rents.  I use 
oil rents as the interaction variable in order to analyse if the oil curse is present in all three 
regime types, and if the effect of oil on the probability of democratization is stronger in one of 
the regime types. The interaction variable allows investigation of the conditional effect of oil 
rents in different regime types. A conditional effect means that the effect of one variable on 
                                                 
4
 The analysis is limited to the time series from 1960 to 2010 because of limited data before 1960 and after 
2010.  
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the dependent variable can be different when interacting with one variable than interacting 
with another variable (Skog 2010: 51). In this case: the effect of oil on democratization can be 
stronger in for example limited multiparty regimes than in military regimes when the 
multiplicative effect of oil is included. Here, the interaction variable is in fact interacting with 
different categories of the independent variable. I do this by creating separate interaction 
variables with oil rents for each regime type. 
My model: 
Pr. (Yt+1 =1) = ɸ (X · Z ᵦ) + ε   
The probability of a state being a democracy (Y) in a given year is dependent on the type of 
authoritarian regime (X) measured one year before, multiplied by the effect of rents (Z), also 
one year before controlled for the effect of the control variables. The model can then measure 
the probability of an authoritarian state of a certain type with certain levels of oil rents one 
year, being a democracy the next year. The analysis will be done in two steps: first, I do the 
analysis without the interaction variable (oil rents) as a baseline analysis. Then I do the same 
analysis and include the interaction variable. This allows me to analyse how oil affects the 
probability of democratic transition in the regime types compared to when oil is not included, 
and how oil rents affects the probability of democratic transition in the three regime types 
differently.    
Table 4.1. Democratic transitions between 1960 and 2010
5
: 
 Dictatorship t+1 Democracy t+1 Total 
0 Dictatorship 4,260 90 4,350 
1 Democracy 53 3,269 3,322 
Total 4,313 3,359 7,672 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 The table is extracted from democracy and dictatorship dataset (Cheibub et al. 2009). 
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4.4 Methodological challenges  
In this section I address four main methodological challenges of the analysis. First, I discuss 
estimation and interpretation of interaction models. Then I address the following 
methodological challenges; serial correlation, endogeneity, omitted variable bias and missing 
values.  
Interaction models are common in quantitative political science because they take into 
account that the relationship between political inputs and outputs varies depending on the 
context (Brambor et. al. 2006: 63). But in order to draw conclusions from interaction models, 
it is important to understand and know how to interpret these models. According to Brambor 
et. al. (2006: 71, 72) many papers in the political science literature treat the constitutive 
elements of interaction terms as unconditional or average effects, even though they are not. 
The reason why interaction models capture the intuition behind interaction models is because 
they make the effect of the independent variable X on the dependent variable Y depend on a 
third variable Z (interaction term). Hence, claiming that the constitutive terms represent the 
“unconditional”, “independent” or “average” value is wrong.  
Another important aspect to be aware of is that in the result table of an analysis with 
conditional effects one can only read substantially the marginal effect of X in the unique 
situations when the conditional variable Z is 0 (Brambor 2006: 74). In many cases, this is not 
even substantially possible. In the output of the analysis of this thesis, I will then be able to 
read only the marginal effect of being a military regime (compared to other regime types) on 
the probability of democratization when oil rents are 0. When I want to investigate the effect 
of oil on democratization in different regime types, this is not very useful.  
If one have a multiplicative interaction model it is nearly always necessary to go beyond the 
traditional results table to be able to extract useful information like marginal effects. An 
illustrative way of doing this is by marginal effect plots (Brambor 2006: 76). To make the 
analysis more informative and make it possible to read the marginal effect of being one 
regime type (compared to one of the other types) on the probability of democratization with 
different levels of oil rents, I will add marginal effect plots in chapter five.  
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4.5 Serial correlation 
If the data sample is a simple random sample, one can assume that the residuals are 
independent of each other. This is not necessarily true when using time-series cross-section 
(TSCS) data (Skog 2010: 328). In other words, in TSCS the values of a variable in time t are 
not independent from the values of t-1. A country that starts exporting oil in in any given year 
will have value 0 every year until they starts exporting, and then they are likely to be 
exporting oil every year after this starting point.                      
 
4.6 Endogeneity 
Endogeneity is uncertainty regarding the direction of causality, meaning that the dependent 
variable can affect the independent variables. One example of this is the study of economic 
variables’ effect on democracy. It is reasonable to assume that democracy is affecting 
economic variables, counting for some of the effect. In the case of this thesis, I argue that the 
problem of potential endogeneity is not significant. First, it is obvious that democracy cannot 
affect authoritarian regime type. Second, democracy can affect rentierism (the amount of oil 
revenues as percentage of total revenues) in the sense that oil does not tend to affect 
democracies in such way that they become rentier states (Dunning 2008). However, the 
dependent variable democracy in this analysis is lagged t+1 in order to analyse the probability 
of democratic transition one year after the effect of the explanatory variables, which means 
that the dependent variables is not affecting the independent variables.  
 
4.7 Omitted variable bias 
Social phenomena have complex explanations. Hence, it is inevitable in all social science that 
variables affecting the outcome of the analysis are excluded. It is important however to 
minimalize this omitted variable bias. This bias can make the effects of the independent 
variables spurious. Spurious effects in panel data is often due to omitted variables that vary 
among countries, but not over time, and influence the variable which we want to explain 
(King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 28). Fixed effects can be a way of reducing this problem 
(Skog 2010). However, including fixed effects in an analysis where the dependent variable 
takes binary values is not a good solution (Beck, Kate and Tucker: 1998). By including a 
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number of control variables I minimize the problem of omitted variable bias. The control 
variables are theoretically and empirically associated with democratization, hence they control 
for potentially spurious effects.    
 
4.8 Missing values 
In almost any study using quantitative data there will be missing values. If the researcher does 
not handle missing values with appropriate methods, this will have consequences for the 
results. A review by King et. al. (2001) shows that approximately 94 % of researchers on 
party identification questions use listwise deletion to eliminate entire observations, losing one 
third of their data on average. This also holds for government data. This results in loss of 
valuable information at best, and selection bias at worst (King et. al. 2001: 49). One of my 
control variables (will be presented in more detail later in this chapter), The Gini index, has 
the most missing values of the variables in my analysis. It has only only 819 observations out 
of all the possible 7784.  With a total number of 90 democratic transitions between 1960 and 
2010 I will lose too many transitions to expect significant results by simply eliminate the 
entire observations. Another problem with this high number of missing values is potential 
selection bias. On The Gini index one cannot expect that the values are missing by random. A 
quick look at the data shows that the Latin American countries for some reason have much 
more data on this variable than all other countries from other regions which all have very few 
observations.   
 
4.9 Multiple imputations 
In order to solve the problems with missing values described above, I perform multiple 
imputations. Multiple imputation is an acknowledged method of dealing with missing values 
see (Allison 1999, Honaker and King 2010, King et. al. 2001). I do the multiple imputations 
using the Amelia View software. The idea of multiple imputation is extract relevant 
information from the observed portions of a data set, to impute multiple (five) values for each 
missing cell. These values are then used to construct “complete” data sets. Multiple 
imputation fills in the holes in the data using a predictive model that incorporates all available 
information in the observed data together with any prior knowledge. Hence, the model does 
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not make up any data, but predicts values based on all information in the data and 
incorporating into the standard errors the variation across the estimates from each completed 
data set (Honaker and King 2010: 563). I merge the five data sets with imputed values by 
averaging the values. I then use the imputed variables in the analysis.   
 
4.10 Democracy 
The dependent variable is transition to democracy. It is a dichotomous minimalist measure of 
political regime, and is categorized as either democracy or autocracy. The data is derived 
from “Democracy and dictatorship revisited” by Cheibub et al. from now on referred to as 
DD. 
Cheibub et al. (2009) uses a minimalist definition of democracy introduced by Alvarez et al. 
(1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000), and based on Dahl’s term “contestation” as the essential 
feature of democracy (Przeworski et al. 2000: 15). “Democracies are regimes in which 
governmental offices are filled as a consequence of constant elections. This definition has two 
main parts: “offices” and “contestation”. For a regime to be democratic, both the chief 
executive office and the legislative body must be filled by elections. Contestation occurs 
when there exists an opposition that has some chance of winning office as a consequence of 
elections” (Cheibub et al. 2010: 69). This involves three features (Przeworski 1991 in 
Cheibub et al. 2010): First, ex ante uncertainty: the outcome of the election is not known in 
advance, second, ex post irreversibility: the winner of the election actually takes office. Third, 
repeatability: elections that meet the first two criteria are held at regular and known intervals.  
The theoretical definition of democracy must then be operationalized. A regime is classified 
as a democracy if it meets all the following requirements (Cheibub et al. 2010: 69): 
1. The chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by a body that was itself 
popularly elected.    
2. The legislator must be popularly elected. 
3. There must be more than one party competing in the election. 
4. An alternation of power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the 
incumbent to office must have taken place.  
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There are several reasons for using a dichotomous variable for measuring democracy.  One is 
that including other dimensions (civil liberties, political rights, freedom of press and other 
freedoms) like Freedom House and POLITY does, makes it harder to specify the causal 
mechanisms that link regime and the outcomes of interest (Cheibub et al. 2010: 73). Another 
reason is that a minimalist definition of democracy is compatible with various ways that 
political and social life could be organized. It does not attach any weight to the specific way 
governments are formed, political parties compete, candidates are selected, voters vote or the 
way justice, economy or private property is organized. Third, one does not need to view the 
minimalist definition of democracy as sufficient to find it useful. All theories of democracy 
can find it to be necessary. The classification of democracies and dictatorships can be 
interpreted as one component of a broader characterization including other features of 
political regimes. In this case, DD holds not only validity, but also reliability (Cheibub et al. 
2010: 74). Finally, because DD is based on observational data, it is reproducible. This is a 
characteristic that is not present in any other existing measures of political regimes (Cheibub 
et al. 2010: 97).       
One consequence of the minimalist definition of democracy described above is that we do not 
know if all regimes that satisfy these criteria are in fact democracies. Botswana is an example. 
Government offices in Botswana are filled by elections, and there are competing parties. 
There is little repression and there are no exceptional allegations of fraud. Thereby, by the 
requirements for democracy described above, Botswana should be categorised as a 
democracy. However, the ruling party of Botswana has held office since independence, and 
we cannot know if they will hold elections if they are not sure to win, or if they are willing to 
leave office if they lose an election. In situations like this one must either take the risk of 
committing the error of excluding as democracies countries that are in fact democracies (type 
1 error) or including as democracies countries that are not democracies (type 2 error) 
(Przeworski et al. 2000). (Botswana is categorized as a dictatorship in the dataset).  
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Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics, democracy: 
Democracy Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 Dictatorship 4433 56.28 56.28 
1 Democracy 3444 43.72 100.00 
Total 7877 100.00 100.00 
 
 
4.11 Authoritarian regime types 
The independent variable is authoritarian regime type. The data from Hadenius and Teorell 
(2007) have five main categories: Military regime, Monarchy, no-party regime, one-party 
regime and limited multiparty regime. I will use three of these categories in the analysis: 
military regimes, one-party regimes and limited multiparty regimes.    
I use Hadenius and Teorell’s (2007) regime typology for categorizing different authoritarian 
regime types. This typology is based on Barbara Geddes’s (1999 seminal contribution on the 
field of regime typology. The data of Hadenius and Teorell has some considerable 
improvements. First, it covers some regime types that Geddes omits: monarchies and 
competitive autocracies. Second, it does not treat “personalism” as a regime type, but as 
something more or less present in the regime types mentioned. Third, it distinguishes between 
true one-party regimes and dominant party regimes. Limited multiparty regimes with one 
dominant party seem to have many of the same characteristics as true one-party regimes. This 
is done by controlling for party dominance within the limited multiparty regimes by creating a 
sub category containing parties taking more than two thirds of the vote, and a continues 
variable, the proportion of seats held by the largest party within the limited multiparty system 
(Hadenius and Teorell 2007: 145).   
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Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics, authoritarian regime type: 
Regime type Freq. Percent Cum. 
Limited multiparty  1454 21.88 21.88 
One-party regime 810 12.19 34.07 
Military regime 424 06.38 40.45 
Total 2688 40.45  
 
 
4.12 Oil  
The interaction variable is oil rents. The interaction term is included in order to investigate the 
interaction effect of oil rents on the three authoritarian regime types; military regimes, one-
party regimes and limited multiparty regimes. As discussed in earlier chapters, oil as such is 
not affecting political regime. It is the causes of an economy based on oil revenues that seems 
affect political regime. This is why oil is simply not measured as oil extraction or oil export 
itself. The economic effect of oil is defined as rents, which is measured as the oil export to 
total export ratio. The ratio is made of the two following variables: oil net export and total 
export
6
. The variables are taken from the Quality of governance dataset and the amounts are 
in millions US dollar.   
Table 4.4. Descriptive statistics, oil export to total export ratio. 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max 
Oil export to total 
export ratio 
 
2402 
 
.169 
 
.728 
 
-2.079 
 
5.656 
 
As table 4.4 shows, the maximum oil rate is 5.6, even though this should not be possible. A 
look at the data reveals that this applies for some years in typically large oil exporters. Why 
some countries in some years are observed with a higher oil export than total export is 
difficult to tell. This problem also holds for the imputed values of the oil ratio variable. After 
imputation some “unrealistic” values can occur because they can be the imputation model 
                                                 
6
 The total export variable is converted into constant 2000 US. dollars using the inflation conversion factor 
(oregonstate.edu/cla/polisci/sahr/sahr).  
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does not take into account substantial barriers like for example that a share or a ratio cannot 
be higher than one. I argue that the best solution to this is setting all values over one on the 
imputed oil ratio variable as one. The same problem holds for the imputed variable for 
economic inequality (The Gini index) which runs from 0-100. I make limits to this variable as 
well by coding all values under 0 and over 100 to respectively 0 and 100. Doing this will not 
really affect the outcome of the analysis because the imputed values outside 0-100 are 
impossible. Hence, values below 0 might be mathematically correct for really unequal 
countries, but in reality the value would have been 0.      
 
4.13 Control variables 
The following section is a review of the control variables included in the analysis. One 
subtitle form of selection bias is omitted variable bias, which is the exclusion of some variable 
that may influence a causal connection between the explanatory variables and the variable we 
want to explain (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 28). The control variables are theoretically 
and empirically linked to democratization in the literature, and are included in order to control 
for omitted variable bias. The control variables are; GDP per capita, economic inequality, 
ethnic tension, Islam, Middle East and North Africa.  
 
4.13.1 GDP per capita 
As argued, democracy is associated with economic development. In short, poor countries tend 
to have authoritarian governance and rich countries tend to be democratic. The specific 
mechanisms of this link is somehow uncertain in the literature, but according to Przewoski et 
al. (2000) this relationship is evident because countries are more likely to stay democratic in a 
wealthy society, and not because of economic development under authoritarian rule. In other 
words, the link between development and democracy is endogenous, meaning that democracy 
is also likely to affect development. This exact relationship is however not crucial to the 
analysis of this thesis, as long as I control for the possible effect of development on 
democratization. One widely accepted measure of level of development is GDP per capita. I 
implement the variable, operationalized as real GDP per capita in order to control for the 
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effect of development. The variable is taken from Gleditsch – expanded trade and GDP data 
and found in the Quality of government dataset.   
 
4.13.2 Growth 
Economic performance affects the likelihood of regime breakdown in both democracies and 
autocracies. Positive growth increases regime duration and negative growth increases the 
likelihood of regime breakdown (Przeworski et al. 2000: 106-116). Hence, I include a 
variable operationalized as GDP per capita growth in percent from World development 
indicators, found in the Quality of government dataset.  
 
4.13.3 Economic inequality  
According to Dunning (2008) economic inequality seems to be the most important indicator 
affecting weather oil rents have a positive or negative effect on the probability of democratic 
transition. I include a control variable for economic inequality operationalized as score on the 
Gini index (high values means high inequality), taken from the Quality of government 
dataset.  
 
4.13.4 Ethnic fractionalization 
It is a reasonable assumption that countries with high ethnic fractionalization have more 
conflicts, and that this leads to instability that can be negative for democratization. It is also 
likely that democracies to a larger extent can temper the level of conflict. When everyone has 
the freedom of speech and right to protest, vote and be represented, conflicts are likely to be 
less violent. Statistical research on ethnic heterogeneity and conflict level shows that ethnic 
tension leads to higher levels of conflict in authoritarian regimes than in democracies, see 
(Mousseau 2001). I include a control variable for ethnic fractionalization from Alesina, 
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg, measuring the probability that two randomly 
selected people belong to different ethnolinguistic group. Higher numbers means higher level 
of ethnic fractionalization.    
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4.13.5 Islam 
The variable Islam is measured by the Muslim percentage of the state’s total population. 
Studies suggested that states with a large Muslim population are less democratic than states 
with a small Muslim population. Among all world religions, Islam is tested to have the most 
statistically significant influence on a state’s regime type (Ross 2001: 338). The variable is 
taken from La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, and found in the Quality of 
government dataset.  
 
4.13.6 Middle East and North Africa   
The attitude towards democracy in a country’s region and neighbouring countries is known to 
have an impact on the probability of democratization (Carothers 2007, Pratt 2007, Brynen 
1995). Being a country in the Middle East and Northern Africa is therefore likely to affect the 
probability of democratic transition in statistical analysis. I include this regional aspect by 
generating a dummy variable “Middle East and North Africa” based on Hadenius and 
Teorell’s “Region of the county” in the quality of government dataset.  
 
4.14 Summary 
In this chapter I have presented the research design of the analysis. I argued that a quantitative 
design is the best way of making general inference about how oil affects the probability of 
democratic transition in different regime types. In order to do that, one needs to look at a large 
number of units. Analysing time-series cross-section data allows me to look at repeated 
observations of the same countries over time, discovering effects both over time and between 
countries. I have presented the dependent, independent and interaction variable, and also the 
control variable of the analysis. A summary statistics of these variables is presented in table 
4.5 and 4.6.   
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Table 4.5. Summary statistics: 1960-2010 non-imputed data.   
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max 
Democracy 7784 .439 .496 0 1 
Reg. type 3992 1.185     1.100           0 3 
Oil exp. ratio 2402 .169 .728    -2.079    5.656 
GDP 7216 7168.279     8123.908          170.55 84408.23 
Growth 6966 2.035     6.061   -50.290    92.585 
Inequality 818 42.659      10.096       20.960 74.330 
Ethnic frac. 8036 .445      .262   0 .930 
Muslim  8432 22.522     35.519           0 99.9 
Region 8432 .118     .323           0 1 
 
Table 4.6. Summary statistics: 1960-2010 imputed data
7
. 
Variable 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max 
Imputed Oil 
exp. ratio 
 
10708 .160 .464 -6.281 1 
Imputed 
growth 
 
10708 4.019 5.251 -51.030 106.279 
Imputed 
Inequality 
 
10708 39.024 7.890 0 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 The number of observations for imputed values are higher than the unimputed because the imputation 
process imputes all possible values, also countries that did not exist in the actual year as f. ex. Serbia before 
1990. These values will not be part of the analysis.  
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Chapter 5 
Analysis 
 
In this chapter I present the results from the statistical analysis. First I go through the stages of 
the analysis, before I present some descriptive statistics. Then, I present the basic model 
without oil rents, before I present the analysis with the interaction term of oil rents. I also 
make a marginal effect plot in order to interpret the effect of oil rents on the probability of 
democratization in a substantially more meaningful way. In the end of the chapter there is a 
discussion of the results.  
The background for this thesis is the oil curse, which claims that oil makes democratization 
less likely. As presented earlier, the aim of this thesis is to investigate if the oil curse is valid 
for the three authoritarian regime types: limited multiparty regimes, one-party regimes and 
military regimes. Previous investigation of the oil curse does not take different authoritarian 
regime types into account. I argue that the institutional differences of the regime types could 
make a difference in how oil rents affect the possibility of democratic transition. As presented 
in chapter three, I hypothesize the causal mechanisms of the oil curse to be stronger in one-
party regimes than in the two other regime types, and stronger in limited multiparty regimes 
than in military regimes. Though, I expect the oil curse to be valid for all authoritarian regime 
types.  
 
5.1 Stages of the analysis 
Before the results of the probit regression are presented, I present some descriptive statistics. 
The probit regression is done in two stages. First I present the results from the basic model, 
without oil as conditional effect. Second, I present the results from the probit regression with 
the conditional effects of oil. I construct three interaction terms: one for each authoritarian 
regime type interacted with oil rents. By defining in turn each of the regime types as reference 
category, I am able to analyse the effect of oil rents in different regime types, compared to 
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each other. I also make marginal effect plots for the predictive marginal effects of different 
levels of oil rents in the different regime types. 
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Before I turn to the results of the analysis I take a closer look at the data. Figure 5.1 shows the 
total number of democracies in the world from 1960-2010. As the figure shows, the number 
of democracies started to increase rapidly in the late 1970’s, increasing up until around 1990. 
This is what is called the third wave of democratization, initiated by the democratic 
transitions in Southern Europe from the midt 1970’s as described in chapter 1. The large 
increase in the number of democracies during the 1980’s is mainly caused by the fall of 
military regimes and democratic transitions in Latin America see (Caroters 2002) in the early 
1980’s and the fall of communist states in Eastern Europe in the late 1980’s.   
 
 
Figure 5.1. Number of democracies in the world from 1960-2010: 
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5.3 Oil rents and probability of democratization 
As presented in chapter three, differences between authoritarian regime types cause them to 
break down in systematically different ways which affect transition outcomes (Geddes 1999). 
Geddes finds that limited multiparty regimes transition most often to democracy, while 
military regimes and one-party regimes transition to democracy with approximately the same 
frequency (Geddes 1999: 121). As presented in the descriptive statistics the number of 
democratic transitions between 1960 and 2010 for the three regime types are: 22 for limited 
multiparty regimes, 11 for one-party regimes and 23 for military regimes. The basic probit 
regression model shows the probability of democratic transition for the three regime types, 
controlled for GDP, Growth, economic inequality, ethnic fractionalization, Islam and Middle 
East and North Africa. The extended regression shows the probability of democratization for 
the three regime types with the conditional effect of oil with the respective regime types as 
reference categories. 
Before I move to the output of the analysis, I take a look at the interpretation of probit 
coefficients. If the coefficient on X is 0.567, it means that a one percent increase in X will 
raise the probability of Y=1 by 0.567. This holds for continues variables. In case of regime 
type (categorical variable), the coefficients express how the probability of Y=1 changes when 
moving from the reference category to the category of choice. All regime types are in turn 
treated as reference category in order to compare them. As table ?? shows, limited multiparty 
regimes have the highest probability of democratic transition compared to the category 
“others”. This category is made up by all other authoritarian regime types than the three 
represented in the analysis. Examples of regime types of this category are monarchies, no-
party regimes and some hybrids. One-party regimes on the other hand have much less 
probability of democratizing than “others”. Both these results are statistically significant on a 
one-percent level
8. Going from the category “others” to limited multiparty regime raises the 
probability of democratization by more than 1, while going from “others” to one-party regime 
lowers the probability of democratization by -0.785.  
 
Looking at limited multiparty regimes as reference category, military regimes and one-party 
regimes both are significant and take negative signs, which means that limited multiparty 
                                                 
8
 I follow the standard of accepting results on a five-percent level of significance = P<0.05.  
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regimes have the highest probability of democratization of the regime types under 
investigation. This is in line with what is known about democratization in the different regime 
types, discussed in chapter three. The output on table 5.1 also confirms what is known from 
the literature and the descriptive statistics; military regimes have a higher probability of 
democratic transition than one-party regimes also when the effect of the control variables are 
controlled for.     
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Table 5.1: Results of probit regression on the probability of democratization for different 
regime types without the conditional effect of oil.  
Democracy  Other reg. types 
as reference 
category 
Limited 
multiparty as 
reference cat. 
Military as 
reference 
category 
One-party as 
reference 
category 
     
     
Others 
 
 -1.001*** 
(0.080) 
0.172 
(0.141) 
0.785*** 
(0.158) 
Limited multiparty 1.001*** 
(0.080) 
 1.173*** 
(0.128) 
1.786*** 
(0.147) 
Military  -0.172 
(0.141) 
-1.173*** 
(0.128) 
 0.613*** 
(0.186) 
One-party -0.785*** 
(0.158) 
-1.786*** 
(0.147) 
-0.613*** 
(0.186) 
 
     
Oil ratio -.802*** 
(0.176) 
-0.791*** -0.005 
(0.275) 
-1.191** 
     
Growth -0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
Inequality 0.040*** 
(0.004) 
0.040*** 
(0.004) 
0.040*** 
(0.004) 
0.040*** 
(0.049) 
Ethnic frac. -0.687*** 
(0.138) 
-0.687*** 
(0.138) 
-0.687*** 
(0.138) 
-0.687*** 
(-0.415) 
Muslim -0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(-0.000) 
NA. ME.
9
 -0.426** 
(0.158) 
-0.426** 
(0.158) 
-0.426* 
(0.158) 
-0.426** 
(-0.117) 
Const. -2.538*** 
(0.193) 
-1.537*** 
(0.190) 
-2.710*** 
(0.214) 
-3.323*** 
(-2.892) 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
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Table 5.2 shows the results from the probit regression with the conditional effect of oil 
included. It shows that the interaction term of military regimes with oil rents turns out 
significant and takes positive signs with all other regime types as reference category. This 
indicates that oil rents have a stronger negative effect on one-party regimes and limited 
multiparty regimes than on military regimes. This is partly in line with the theoretical 
assumptions I make in chapter three (see Magaloni and Kricheli 2010 and Devenport 2007) 
that oil rents will have a stronger negative effect on democratization in one-party regimes 
because of the strong rent seeking mechanisms of what is called “the tyrannical peace” in one-
party regimes. Hence, I can say that hypothesis 5: the effect of oil on the probability of 
democratization is stronger in limited multiparty regimes than in military regimes is 
supported so far.  
The table also indicates that oil has a stronger negative effect in one-party regimes than in 
limited multiparty regimes, but the result does not turn out significant. Hence, hypothesis 4 
the negative effect of oil on the probability of democratization is stronger in one-party 
regimes than in military regimes and limited multiparty regimes cannot be supported.  
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Table 5.2: Probit regression with the conditional effect of oil. 
Democracy 
 
Other reg. 
types as 
reference 
category 
Limited 
multiparty as 
reference cat. 
Military as 
reference 
category 
One-party as 
reference 
category 
     
Others*oil 
 
 -0.010 
(0.200) 
-0.797* 
(0.322) 
0.389 
(0.428) 
Limt. Multiparty*oil 
 
0.010 
(0.200) 
 -0.786** 
(0.294) 
0.400 
(0.407) 
Military*oil 
 
0.797* 
(0.322) 
0.786** 
(0.294) 
 1.186* 
(0.480) 
One-party*oil 
 
-0.389 
(0.428) 
-0.400 
(0.407) 
-1.186* 
(0.480) 
 
     
Growth 
 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
Inequality 
 
0.040*** 
(0.004) 
0.040*** 
(0.004) 
0.040*** 
(0.004) 
0.040*** 
(0.049) 
Ethnic frac. 
 
-0.687*** 
(0.138) 
-0.687*** 
(0.138) 
-0.687*** 
(0.138) 
-0.687*** 
(-0.415) 
Muslim 
 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(-0.000) 
NA. ME. 
 
-0.426** 
(0.158) 
-0.426** 
(0.158) 
-0.426* 
(0.158) 
-0.426** 
(-0.117) 
Constant 
 
-2.538*** 
(0.193) 
-1.537*** 
(0.190) 
-2.710*** 
(0.214) 
-3.323*** 
(-2.892) 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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According to the discussion in chapter four, it can be difficult to interpret the coefficients of 
interaction models substantially, and even more difficult when there is a probit model. To 
really see the marginal effects, the probability of democratization when oil rents have 
different values, one has to look beyond the regression table. Tabel 5.3 shows the marginal 
effects of the predicted probabilities of democratization for different levels of oil rents in the 
three regime types.   
The marginal effects in table 5.3 shows that the predicted probability of democratization goes 
down the higher the level of oil rents for all three regime types, except for military regimes. 
Even though the margin turns out significant and goes down from 0.062 to 0.063 when oil 
rents are higher than 0.6, this is a very small change, and the margin does not change at all 
between oil rents of 0 to 0.4 and 0.4 to 1. The predicted probability for limited multiparty 
turns out significant and goes down from over 0.3 when oil rents are 0 down to 0.12 when oil 
rents are 1. The probability of democratization for limited multiparty regimes also goes down 
the more oil rents there is. For one-party regimes, the predicted probability of democratization 
is as low as 0.018 when oil rents are 0 and goes down to almost 0 when oil rents are 1. The 
margins of one-party regimes are not significant when oil rents are above 0.2.  
In the case of limited multiparty regimes, this means that hypothesis 3 can be supported. The 
oil curse seems to be valid for this regime type. The predicted probability of limited 
multiparty regimes has the largest decrease in predicted probability from oil rents of 0 to 0.2, 
indicating that the effect of oil, as expected, is not linear in this regime type, even if the 
predicted probability is going down the more oil rents there are.  
The margins for military regimes turn out significant, but the predicted probability of 
democratization does (almost) not decrease with higher oil rents. Hence, hypothesis 1 is 
rejected. It seems that the oil curse is not valid in military regimes. This is in line with the 
outputs of table 5.2 which shows that the effect of oil rents are stronger in the two other 
regime types than in military regimes.  
The margins of one- party regimes do not turn out significant on oil rents higher than 0.2. 
Hence, hypothesis 2 can only be partly supported, because it can be claimed that the 
hypothesis is supported when oil rents are between 0 and 0.2, and the results are statistically 
significant. The margins indicate some effect of oil, but the probability is very low from the 
beginning. The reason why the results not turn out significant with oil rents higher than 0.2 
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can be that there are too few observations of one-party regimes with high oil rents, hence the 
results turn out insecure.   
 
Table 5.3. Marginal effects of the predicted probability of democratization with different 
levels of oil rents.  
Margin     
Oil rents Limited multiparty Military One-party 
0 0.328*** 
(0.013) 
0.063*** 
(0.014) 
0.018** 
(0.005) 
0.2 0.277*** 
(0.012) 
0.063*** 
(0.011) 
0.010* 
(0.004) 
0.4 0.231*** 
(0.015) 
0.063*** 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.6 0.189*** 
(0.017) 
0.062*** 
(0.016) 
0.002 
(.002) 
0.8 0.152*** 
(0.019) 
0.062*** 
(0.021) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
1 0.120*** 
(0.020) 
0.062* 
(0.026) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
In figure 5.2 it is easy to see the predicted margins of the different regime types. The red line 
shows the negative effect of oil on the probability of democratization in limited multiparty 
regimes. The green horizontal line of military regimes shows that oil rents have no real effect 
on the probability of democratization. The yellow line of one-party regimes shows a negative 
but weak effect of oil rents.  
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Figure5.2. Marginal effects for the probability of democratization in different regime types: 
 
 
Looking at the marginal effects in figure 5.2 one can say that the oil curse is present in all 
regime types except in military regimes. The negative effect of oil on the probability of 
democratization seems to be strongest in limited multiparty regimes, but limited multiparty 
regimes also have the highest probability of democratizing in the first place. Hence, there is a 
larger potential effect, since these regimes are less authoritarian in design. The margins for 
one-party regimes also show a negative effect of oil on democratization (even though the 
results are not significant), but the predicted probability show a relatively small decrease as 
oil rents increase. The probability of democratization in one-party regimes though, is low 
already with oil rents on 0, so there is obviously limited by how much it can decrease. 
Though, the predicted probability is significant with oil rents from 0 to 0.2, indicating that the 
oil curse is present also in one-party regimes. So why does oil seem to have no effect on 
democratization in military regimes? Turning to the theory, military regimes seem to be 
fragile and have a short life expectancy and military officers may place higher value on the 
survival and efficacy of the military itself than in staying in office for as long as possible 
(Geddes 1999). Because of this it may be that the rentier effect of oil is not so strong in these 
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regimes because, if the will of staying in power is lower than in other regimes they will not 
make use of the rents in the same way as for example limited multiparty regimes. Another 
aspect is that military regimes may not need to buy of military officers in the same way as a 
civilian authoritarian government. Military regimes are neither as dependent of keeping up the 
popularity as limited multiparty regimes, as discussed earlier. Money from rents can be more 
important for regime survival when the regime actually have to stay popular among a large 
share of the population to avoid losing elections.   
 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter I have presented the results of the statistical analysis. The aim of the thesis was 
to investigate the oil curse in the three authoritarian regime types: limited multiparty regimes, 
military regimes and one-party regimes. This chapter shows the probit regressions and 
marginal effects of how oil rents affect the probability of democratization in the regime types. 
The first three hypotheses derived from chapter three where that the oil curse is valid for all 
three regime types. The results from the analysis shows that H1: the oil curse is valid for 
military regimes is rejected (I argue that the change of 0.001 in predicted probability of 
democratization from oil rents of 0.4 to 0.6 means that there is practically no effect, especially 
when there is no other changes of the predicted margins). The result for this regime type turns 
out significant, with no effect of oil rents on democratization. The results for one-party 
regimes do not turn out significant, and H2: the oil curse is valid for one-party regimes, 
cannot be supported, nor rejected. The results of the predicted margins for limited multiparty 
regimes turn out significant and shows a negative effect of oil on the probability of 
democratization, hence H3 the oil curse is valid for limited multiparty regimes is supported. 
The analysis also shows that the effect of oil rents is stronger in limited multiparty regimes 
than in military regimes. The results also indicates that the oil curse is stronger in limited 
multiparty regimes than in one-party regimes, but since the results for one-party regimes are 
not statistically significant, I cannot claim that the H4 is supported. In the next chapter I will 
go briefly through some robustness tests in order to evaluate the uncertainty of the results of 
the analysis. 
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Chapter 6 
Robustness tests 
 
In this section I will briefly go through some robustness tests in order to evaluate the 
uncertainty of the results of the analysis. I will comment on how different operationalisations 
and different lag-structures affect the results. I will also test for multicollinearity and 
influential cases and outliers. 
 
6.1 Different operationalisation  
In chapter one and four I argued why I prefer a minimalist definition and operationalisation of 
democracy (Alvarez et al. 1996) and (Przeworski et al. 2000). The dichotomous variable of 
democracy offered from the DD dataset (ACLP index) is based on a qualitative classification 
of democracy (Cheibub 2010: 74) and makes it easier to specify the causal mechanisms that 
link regime and the outcomes of interest (Cheibub 2010: 73). Despite this argument, it is 
possible that some aspects of the ACLP index affect my results. Another widely used 
operationalisation of democracy is the Polity index. In order to see if the results change 
significantly, I run the analysis with the Polity index as dependent variable. The index goes 
from -10 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic). I follow most scholars using the Polity 
index in probit or logit analysis and dichotomize the variable by coding all values of 6 or 
more (Hadenius and Theorel 2007) as democratic.   
The results of the probit regression with the Polity index as dependent variable does not 
substantially change the main findings of the analysis (see the table in appendix B). The 
directions of the coefficients do not change direction except the coefficient between one-party 
regimes and other regime types. This coefficient is still not statistically significant. I interpret 
this as one-party regimes are sensitive to model specifications because this category has quite 
few observations, and especially few democratic transitions. The predicted probability of 
democratization on different levels of oil rents (marginal effects) comes out with the same 
main findings. The probability of democratization decreases as the level of oil goes up for all 
regime types except for military regimes. The graph is found in the appendix.   
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6.2 Different lag-structures 
I run the original model with a one-year lag on the dependent variable democracy. This model 
captures the actual democratic transition by analysing all other variables one year before the 
transition. In order to test if my results also hold for more established democracies I change 
the variable democracy to a five year lag.  
I run the probit regressions with the democracy variable lagged five years instead of one as in 
the original analysis. When changing the lag of democracy from one to five years none of the 
coefficients change direction. The coefficients change within the same direction, but the 
results do not change the main findings of the analysis, nor change the view on the 
hypothesis. The statistical significance is actually improved on many coefficients, but the 
coefficients between limited multiparty regimes and one-party regimes are still insignificant. 
A look at the marginal effect plot reveals the same patterns as the original analysis, but with 
higher probability of democratization in most levels of oil rents. The probability of 
democratization still decreases when oil rents increase in all regime types except for military 
regimes, as in the analysis with one year lag. In the case of military regimes the predictive 
margins is slightly increasing as oil rents increase. I take this as an indication of robust 
findings in my model, but that different lag-structures can improve the statistical significance. 
The results also hold for democracies surviving for more than one year. The result tables of 
the probit regression and the marginal effect plot with a five year lag on democracy is found 
in the appendix.     
 
6.3 Multicollinearity 
Collinearity means that two variables are near perfect linear combinations of each other.  
When there are more than two variables involved it is called multicollinearity. The-VIF test 
(variance inflation factor) tests for multicollinearity (ats.ucla.edu). I run the VIF-test to check 
for multicollinearity and find no results that indicate problems of multicollinearity. As a rule 
of thumb, values less than 10 (tolerance of 1/VIF) are considered ok (ats.ucla.edu). I find no 
values over 2.23 and consider multicollinearity not to be a problem in my analysis.   
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6.4 Influential cases and outliers 
Influential cases and outliers are a possible problem for the model if there are atypical 
observations that drive the results. A specific measure for the influence of outliers is the 
dfbeta measure. This is a measure for how each coefficient is changed by deleting the 
observation (ats.ucla.edu). I produce dfbeta variables for each of the predictors in STATA, 
and run a scatter plot, to see if there are any observations that I need to investigate further in 
case of driving the results too much. The scatter plot is found in the appendix. A dfbeta value 
excessing 2/sqrt(n) requires further investigation (ats.ucla.edu) In the case of this analysis it 
means values excessing 2/sqrt(3502) = +/- 0.033. As can be seen in the scatter plot in 
appendix B, none of the dfbeta values exceeds 0.030 and I consider my analysis not to be 
driven too much by outliers or atypical observations.      
 
6.5 Summary 
In this chapter I have done some robustness tests in order to evaluate the uncertainty of my 
analysis. I have commented on how different operationalisations and different lag-structures 
affect the results, and tested for multicollinearity and influential cases and outliers. Changing 
the operationalization of democracy using the Polity index does not change the main findings 
of the analysis. Changing the lag structure from one to five year lag on democracy did not 
change the results of negative effects of oil on the probability of democratization in the three 
regime types, but some of the coefficients got increased statistical significance. The test for 
multicollinearity and influential cases and outliers showed that neither of these potential 
problems drives the results of the analysis.  
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Chapter 7 
Concluding remarks 
 
This thesis has been guided by the two following research questions: 1) is the oil curse valid 
for the three authoritarian regime types: limited multiparty regimes, military regimes and one-
party regimes? 2) Are the antidemocratic effects of oil rents stronger in some types of 
authoritarian regimes than others? In this chapter I will complete the thesis by going through 
the hypotheses and summing up the major findings. I will also address some theoretical 
implications of the findings and suggest some paths for further research.  
 
7.1 Hypotheses 
I will now go through the hypothesis and comment the results of the analysis.  
H1: the oil curse is valid for military regimes 
The results of the probit analysis and the marginal effect plot came out significant on military 
regimes. The predicted margins on the effect of oil showed that the probability of 
democratization did not change with more oil rents, finding that the oil curse is not valid for 
this regime type. H1 has to be rejected.  
H2: the oil curse is valid for one-party regimes 
The predicted margins for one-party regimes came out significant with oil rents from 0 to 0.2, 
suggesting that the oil curse is valid for one-party regimes, but H2 can only be partly 
supported. Because of lack of significant results, H2 cannot be supported with oil rents larger 
than 0.2. 
H3: the oil cure is valid for limited multiparty regimes 
The predicted margins are statistically significant and show a strong negative effect of oil on 
the probability of democratization in limited multiparty regimes. H3 is supported.  
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H4: The negative effect of oil on the probability of democratization is stronger in one-party 
regimes than in military regimes and limited multiparty regimes. 
The result of the analysis shows that the negative effect of oil is stronger in one-party regimes 
than in military regimes. Both the probit regression and predicted margins turn out significant 
and confirm this. The probit regression for one-party regimes with limited multiparty regimes 
as reference category (and opposite) indicate a negative effect of oil going from limited 
multiparty regimes to one-party regimes, but do not come out significant. These results 
indicate that the negative effect of oil is stronger in one-party regimes than in limited 
multiparty regimes, but H4 cannot be supported because of insignificant results.  
 
H5: The negative effect of oil in the probability of democratization is stronger in limited 
multiparty regimes than in military regimes.   
Both the result from the probit regression and the predicted mrgins show that the negative 
effect of oil on the probability of democratization is stronger in limited multiparty regimes 
than in military regimes. As commented above, the effect of oil in military regimes was 
almost zero. H5 is supported.   
 
7.2 Summary 
The analysis finds partial support for my hypotheses. The main empirical findings are that the 
oil curse seems to be valid for limited multiparty regimes and (partly) for one-party regimes. 
The oil curse does not seem to be present in military regimes. Hence the effect of oil rents is 
stronger in both limited multiparty regimes and one-party regimes compared to military 
regimes. The analysis finds a significant negative effect of oil rents (at low levels of oil rents) 
also in one-party regimes, even if the probability of democratization in general is very low in 
these regime type.   
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7.3 Theoretical implications and further research 
The empirical findings of this thesis give support for the oil curse (see Ross 2001, 2012) in 
two of the three investigated regimes types. The oil curse seems to be valid for limited 
multiparty regimes and one-party regimes, but there is no evidence for a negative effect of oil 
in military regimes. The thesis reveals some new features on the oil curse in different regime 
types. However, further research should expand the number of regime types, and look at for 
example different types of hybrid regimes. Another objective for further research should be 
investigating the causal effects of the oil curse in different regime types more directly. This 
could reveal important features to the oil curse theory.  
Separating authoritarian regime types in this thesis has given some new empirical information 
about the oil curse theory. Future research of oil and democratization should focus on what 
aspects of military regimes that make this regime type “immune” against the oil curse. One 
possible explanation which should be investigated further is that many of the military regimes 
that have made democratic transitions are Latin American. It is suggested by Dunning (2008) 
that in countries with great economic inequality, the effect of oil on the probability of 
democratization turns positive.    
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Appendix B Tables and figures from the robustness tests 
 
 
 
 
Predictive margins of regime type and probability of democratization with different levels of 
oil rents (Polity index as democracy): 
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Probit regression with the conditional effect of oil, Polity index as democracy variable: 
Democracy 
 
Other reg. 
types as 
reference 
category 
Limited 
multiparty as 
reference cat. 
Military as 
reference 
category 
One-party as 
reference 
category 
     
Others*oil 
 
 -0.430 
(0.249) 
-1.167** 
(0.393) 
-0.270 
(0.458) 
Limt. Multiparty*oil 
 
0.430 
(0.249) 
 -0.736* 
(0.339) 
0.159 
(0.413) 
Military*oil 
 
1.167** 
(0.393) 
0.736* 
(0.339) 
 0.896 
(0.511) 
One-party*oil 
 
0.270 
(0.458) 
-0.159 
 (0.413) 
-0.896 
(0.511) 
 
     
Growth 
 
-0.008 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.004) 
Inequality 
 
0. 044*** 
(0.004) 
0.044*** 
(0.004) 
0.044*** 
(0.004) 
0.044*** 
(0.004) 
Ethnic frac. 
 
-0.975*** 
(0.157) 
-0.975*** 
(0.157) 
-0.975*** 
(0.157) 
-0.975*** 
(-0.157) 
Muslim 
 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(-0.001) 
NA. ME. 
 
-0.143 
(0.156) 
-0.143 
(0.156) 
-0.143 
(0.156) 
-0.143 
(0.156) 
Constant 
 
-3.084*** 
(0.222) 
-1.966*** 
(0.207) 
-3.064*** 
(0.239) 
-3.661*** 
(0.255) 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Predictive margins of regime type and probability of democratization with five year lag with 
different levels of oil rents: 
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Probit regression with the conditional effect of oil, five year lag on democracy: 
Democracy 
 
Other reg. 
types as 
reference 
category 
Limited 
multiparty as 
reference cat. 
Military as 
reference 
category 
One-party as 
reference 
category 
     
Others*oil 
 
 0.426* 
(0.188) 
-0.623** 
(0.231) 
0.683** 
(0.262) 
Limt. Multiparty*oil 
 
-0.426* 
 (0.188) 
 -1.049*** 
(0.227) 
0.256 
(0.257) 
Military*oil 
 
0.623** 
(0.231) 
1.049** 
(0.227) 
 1.306*** 
(0.291) 
One-party*oil 
 
-0.683** 
(0. 262) 
-0.256 
(0.257) 
-1.306*** 
(0.291) 
 
     
Growth 
 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
Inequality 
 
0. 031*** 
(0.004) 
0.031*** 
(0.004) 
0.031*** 
(0.004) 
0.031*** 
(0.004) 
Ethnic frac. 
 
-0.659*** 
(0.004) 
-0.659*** 
(0.004) 
-0.659*** 
(0.004) 
-0.659*** 
(-0.004) 
Muslim 
 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(-0.001) 
NA. ME. 
 
-0.586** 
(0.146) 
-0.586** 
(0.146) 
-0.586** 
(0.146) 
-0.586** 
(-0.146) 
Constant 
 
-1.694*** 
(0.182) 
-1.094*** 
(0.188) 
-1.486*** 
(0.191) 
-2.054*** 
(0.177) 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Vif-test: 
. vif 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
  nafr_meast |      2.23    0.447940 
 lp_muslim80 |    2.07    0.482359 
imputed_gini |    1.39    0.718092 
   al_ethnic |        1.38    0.725461 
imputed_oi~o |   1.32    0.758247 
    regtype2 |        1.17    0.855243 
imputed_gr~p |   1.03    0.973655 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.51 
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Scatter plot from the dfbeta-test of influential cases and outliers:  
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